High Valley Concrete, L.L.C. v. Sargent Clerk\u27s Record v. 2 Dckt. 35313 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-24-2008
High Valley Concrete, L.L.C. v. Sargent Clerk's
Record v. 2 Dckt. 35313
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"High Valley Concrete, L.L.C. v. Sargent Clerk's Record v. 2 Dckt. 35313" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 143.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/143
Supreme Court No 35312135373 
Volunie 2 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
CARY SARGENT 
PlaintiffIAppellant 
VS 
DOYLE BECK 
DefendantiRespondent 
And 
MARK FULLER 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, LLC 
PlaintiffIAppellant 
CARY SARGENT AND GLENDALE CONSTRUCTION, 
INC. 
DefendantiRespondent 
Appealed from the District Court of the Seventh 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and 
For Fremont County 
Honorable Brent J. Moss District Judge 1 
i 
- 
- 
>',.,I ,> ~ T ' I  I 
I 
William Fahler, Esq. 
PO Box 501 30 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Attorney for Plaintiff1 
Appellant - Cary Sargent 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
8.4. Driscoll, Esq. 
PO Box 50731 
Attorney for Plaintiff1 
Appellent - H i g l  Valley 
Exhibit "B" 
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William D. Falor, Esq. 
Idaho State Bar No. 1464 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
minx Address: 
P. 0. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0 130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-95 1 8 
I Attorneys fir Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVHNTH JUDICIAL DISTFUCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TKE COUNTY OF PRaMONT 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., 
an Idaho Limited Liability Company 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CARY SAROENT, 
Case No. CV-02-00484 
THIRD PARTY C W  OF
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & 
Defendant. 
- - -- _- _ - - -_ _ - -_ .- _ . __ 
- . 
- - - -.. 
COMES NOW, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C., and hereby submits its third 
I 
I party claim in response to the Writ of Execution and Notice of Attachment isued in this matter 
1 
I and served on behalf of Doyle Beck againat Cary Sargt, attadhg the following: 
1 
"Amended Judgment in Fremont County Case No. CV-07-0 1 18 filed in chatnbers 
in Madison County on March 3 1,2008, in the faoe amount of$82,220.13." 
Deacrlption of Third Party Claim: 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C. has a prior "in timen seourity interest on all 
property of Cary Sargcnt inaluding the judgment he obtained against Doyle Beck in Fremont 
County Case No. CV-07-0 1 1 8 which is b subject of the Notice of Attachment. A copy of such 
3tion to Contest Claim of Exemption and ~hird-party Claim n b \ ~ I M h \  
Exemption I!!sYS A l u n o 3  l u o ! J J a l j  WYSO:8 8 0 0 1  'Il '"V 
security agreement is attached as Exhibit "A". The security agreement is secured by the 
following: 
1. A Mortgage for the real propeaty located in Frernont Counv, 
2, A UCCl Statemeat filed with the Sem- of State's office, specifically 
including any judgment obtained by Cary Sargtnt against Doylc Beck; and 
3. Liens on vehicles owned by Cary Sargent. 
I This Security Agreement was made to secure payment for legal fees and costs incurred as l a result of legal representation provided by HoIdcn, Kidwell, Hnhxl and Crapo, P.L.L.C. to Cmy I Sargent. The mount of the legal s c i c a  provided is $190,874.58 as submitted in Sargent's 
Motion, Memorandum, and Amdavit for Fees in Costs in both matters. Thus, the amount of the 
I third party cltillm protected by the security interest Is c m t l y  $190,874.58. 
Hol&n, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C. continues to provide legal representation for 
I Cary Sargemt and M such he is incurring additional fees and costs which are also secured by 
Security Agreement. 
-- - - 
Therefore, third party Holdm, Kidwell, Habn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. hereby quests the 
-- - - -- - - - - - - 
- -- -- 
-- -- 
-. 
release of the Notice of Attachment dated April 3 2008, and numbered 20080 1764. 
DATeD this @& day of April, 2008. 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapq P.L,L.C 
vlotion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim 4 4 ! I 9 Y S  0 )U 1100 3 1 00'" 4 ~ ( ~ 5 0  : 8 8 0 0 2  * \  1 1 d v )f Exemptior~ 
'age 203 1 
CLR'XIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and 
with my omce in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I s e m d  a copy of the following described pleading or 
document on the attorneys listed below by hand deJivering, by mailin or by facsimile, with the 
correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on this CrC 1(@ 4 ay of April, 2008. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: Third Party Claim of Holden, Kfdwell, Hahn rb Cnpo, 
P.L.L.C. 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Nolden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
Bryan D. Smith 
B. J. Driscoll 
McOrath, Meacham, Smith, P.L.L.C. 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
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[ )L) U. S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fahimile 
[ Jother 
I SECURITY AGREEMENT 
t h i s  Security Agreement made as of this 26" day of January, 2008, and executed by Cary 
Sargent, whose address is 359 North 2400 East, St. Anthony, Idaho 83445, (hereinafter 
"Debtor")). Debtor hereby grants to Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L,L.C. (hereinafter 
"Secured Party"), and to Secured Party's successors and assigns, a security interest in the personal 
property together with all replacement thereof and accessories, parts, additions and accessions 
now or hereafter affixed or used in connection therewith (hereinafter "Co2lateraI") set forth on 
Exhibits A, B, C, D and E. 
I I, The security interest granted hereby is to secure payment and performance of the 
liabilities and obligations of Debtor to Secured Party of every kind and description, direct or 
indirect, absolute or contingent, due or to become due, now existing or hereafter arising, 
specifically including the payment of attorney fees and costs provided to Debtor by Secured Party 
(all hereinafter "Obligations"). 
I 2. Debtor hereby warrants and covenants: 
a. Title. Debtor is competent to enter into this Agreement and is now the 
owner of the Collateral free from any adverse Ifen, security interest or 
encumbrance. 
b. Use. The Collateral is used primarily for Cary Sargent's Business and 
Home. 
c. Location of Collateral. The CollateraLwill bg-locatedin-hemont-Coun& - - 
Debtor will not remove the Collateral from said county without the written consent 
of Secured Party. 
d, Re~idency. Debtor resides and maintains Debtor's chief place of business 
in Fremont County, Idaho. 
e, Fixtures. Some of the Collateral. is to be or has been attached to 4 estate. 
Except as otherwise indicated, the parties intend that said Collateral shall always 
remain personal property. A legal description of  the real estate is as follows: 
Lot 4, Blook 4, Schuldies Subdivision Division 1, Fremont County, 
Idaho as shown on the Plat Recorded March 2,1978, as Instnunent 
No, 352708, Property Address: 359 North 2400 &st, St. Anthony, 
Idaho, Parcel ID Number WOO 149004004A; 
The name of the record owner is Caxy Sargent, Debtor will on demand of  Securcd 
Party furnish the latter with a disclaimer or disclaimers, signed by all pcrsons 
having an interest in the r q l  estate, of any interest in the Collateral which is prior 
to Secured Party's interest. 
Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim j ~ ~ 9 0 : 8  8OOl 'i LJdV 
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f. Perfection of Security Interest. The Debtor agrees to execute and file 
financing statements and do whatever may be necessary under applicable law to 
perfect and continue the Secured Party's interest in the Collateral, dl at Debtor's 
expense. 
g, Sale Prohibited. Debtor will not sell or offer to sell or otherwise transfer 
the Collateral or any interest therein without the written consent of Secured Party. 
Byclaiming proceeds or products of the Collateral in any financing statement 
prepared in conjunction with this Security Agreement, the Secured Party shall not 
be deemed to have given Debtor m implied power to sell or otherwise transfer the 
Collateral or any interest therein. 
h, Ineurance, Debtor will in his discretion keep the Collateral insured by an 
insurer approved by Secured Party against fire, theft and other hazards designated 
at any time by Secured Party, in an amount equal to the full insurable value 
thereof or to all sums secured hereby, with such form of loss payable clause as 
designated by and in favor of Secured Party, and will deliver the policies and 
receipts showing payment of premiums to the Secured Party. In the event of loss, 
Secured Party shall have fbll power to collect any and all insurance upon the 
Collateral and to apply the same at its option to any obligation secured hereby, 
whether or not matured, or to the restoration or repair of the property. Secured 
Party sMl have no liability whatsoever for any lose that may occur by reason of 
the omission or lack of coverage of any such insurance. 
i. Adverse Liens and Use. Debtor will keep the CollateraI free from any 
- .  -- - -  - adverse Iicn,-sccurity interest or encumbrance exocptto the extent such liens, 
security interest or encumbrance currently exists. Debtor will not create nor 
permit the existence of any adverse lien, security interest or encumbrance other 
than that created hereby on the property without the written consent of Secured 
Party. Any certificate of title now or hereafter existing on any of the property will 
be delivered to Secured Party and will recite the interest of Secured Party. Debtor 
will keep the Collateral in good order and repair and will not waste or destroy the 
Collatera.at or any past thereof. Debtor will not use or permit anyone to use, the 
Collateral in violation of any statute, ordinance, or state or federal regulation; and 
Secured Party may examine and inspect the Collateral at any reasonable time, 
wherever located, 
j. Taxes and Assessments. Debtor will pay promptly when due all taxes 
and assessments upon the Collateral or for its use or operation or upon this 
Agreement or upon any note or notes evidencing the obligation. 
3. Purchase Money. To tlie extent the proceeds of any note shall be used to acquire 
said Collateral, Secured Party shall have a purchase money security interest therein. Debtor 
I 2 - Security Agreement 
Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim 
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hereby authorizes Secured Party to disburse said procceds to the seller of the CoHateral andlor to 
the insurance agent or broker, as shown on the records of the Secured Party. 
4, Secured Party's Right to Pay Taxes, Etc.; Debtor's Right to Possession, The 
Secured Party is not required to, but may, at its option discharge taxes, liens or security interests 
or other encumbrances at any time levied or placed on the Collateral, pay for insurance on the 
Collateral, pay for the maintenance and preservation of the Collateral, pay any filing or recording 
fees, or any other charges payable by Debtor and any amount so paid, with interest thereon at the 
maximum rate permitted by law from date of payment until repaid shall be secured hereby and 
shall be repayable by Debtor on demand. The ri&$ granted by this paragraph are not a waiver of 
any other rights of Secured Party arising from breach of any of the covenants hereby by Debtor. 
a. Until Default Debtor may have possession of the Collateral and use it in 
any lawful manner not inconsistent with this Agreement and not inconsistent with 
any policy of insurance thereon. 
5. Default. Time is of the essence of this Security Agreement, and Debtor shall be 
in default under this Agreement upon the happening of any of the following events or conditions: 
a, Default in the payment or performance of any obligation, covenant or 
liability contained or referred to herein or in any note evidencing the same; 
b, Any warranty, representation or statement made or f d s h e d  to Secured 
Party by or on behalf of Debtor proves to have been false in any material respect 
when made or furnished; 
- - -. - - - -. - .- a - 
c. Any event which results in the acceleration o f  the maturity of the 
indebtedness of Debtor to others under any indentwe agreement or undertaking; 
d. Loss, theft, damage, destruction, sale or encumbrance to or of any of the 
Collateral, or the making of any levy, seizure or attachment thereof or thereon; 
e, Death, dissolution, termination of existence, insolvcncy, business fdure, 
appointment of a recefver of any part of the property of, assignment for the benefit 
of crcditors by, or the commencement of any proceeding under any bankruptcy or 
insolvency laws by or against, Debtor of any guarantor or surety for Debtor, or 
entry of any judgment against them, or fdlure of any guarantor or surety for 
Debtor to provide Secured Party with financial Wormation promptly when 
requested by Secured Party. 
f, The S e c w d  Party deems itself insecure, 
I 3 - Seeurlty Agreement 
Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim 
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6, Remedies. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder and at any time 
thereafter, the Secured Party may without notice or demand declare immediately due and payable 
all amounts secured hereby and shall have the remedies of a Secured Party under the Idaho 
Uniform Commercial Code or other applicable law; and without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing: 
a. Debtor agrees to put Secured Party in possession of the Collateral on 
demand; and 
b. Secured Party is authorized to enter any premises where the Collateral is 
situated and take possession of said property without notice or demand and 
without legal proceedings; and 
c. At the request of Secured Party, Debtor will assemble the Collateral and 
make it available to Secured Party at a place designated by Secured Party which is 
reasonably convenient to both parties; and 
d. Debtor agrees that a period of five (5) days from the time notice is sent, by 
first class mail or otherwise, nhdf be a reasonable period of notification of a sale 
or other disposition of the collateral; and 
e. Debtor agrees that any notice or other communication by Secured Party to 
Debtor shall be sent to the mailing address of the Debtor stated herein; and 
f, Debtor agrees to pay on demand the amount of a11 expenses reasonably 
.incurred by SwwedPaxty inpratedng or realizing on .the property. In the event 
that this Security Agreement or any obligation secured by it is referred to an 
attorney for protecting or defending the priority of Secured Party's interest or for 
collection or realization procedures, Debtor agrees to pay a reasonable attorney 
fee, including fees incurred in both trial and appellate courts, or fees incurred 
without suit, and expenses of title search and all court costs and costs of public 
officials. The sums agreed to be paid in this subparagraph shall be secured 
hereby; and 
g. If Sccured Party disposes of the property, Debtor agrees to pay any 
deficiency remaining after application of the net proceeds to any indebtedness 
secured hereby, 
h. Secured Party shall have the right immediately and without Wher  action 
by it, to set off against the obligations of Debtor all money owed by Secured Party 
in any capacity to Debtor, whether or not due, and Secured Party shall be deemed 
to have exercised such right of setoff and to have made a charge against any such 
money immediately upon occurrence of such default even though such charge is 
made or entered on the books of Secured Party subsequent thereto. 
I 4 - Security Agreement 
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and may not be altered or amended except by a writing signed by the Debtor, accepted by Secured 
Party and attached hereto. Any provision found to be invalid shall not invalidate the remainder 
hereof. Waivcr of any default shall not constitute a Waiver of any subsequent default. All 
Secured Party's rights and remedies, whether evidenced hereby or by any other writing shall be 
cumulative and may be exercised singularly or concurrently. Any demand upon or notice to 
Debtor that Secured Party may give shall be effective when addressed and mailed to Debtor's 
address at which Secured Party customarily communicates with Debtor. This Agreement and all 
rights and liabilities hereunder and in and to any and all obligations secured hereby, and in and to 
all CollateraI described above, shall inure to the benefit of the Secured Party and its successors 
and assigns, and shall be binding upon the Debtor and its successor and assigns. Whenever there 
is no outstanding obligation and no commitment on the part of Secured Party under any agreement 
which might give rise to an obligation, Debtor may terminate this Agreement upon written notioe 
to Secwd Party. Prior to such termination, this shall be a continuing Agreement in every respect. 
This instrument is to be governed by the laws of the State of Idaho. If this instrument is signed by 
more than one Debtor, the obligations of Debtor shall be joint and several. All words used herein 
shall be construed to be of such gender and number as the circumstances require and a11 references 
to Debtor shall include all other persons primarily or secondarily liable hereunder. This 
Agreement is intended to t&e effect when signed by Debtor and deliveted to Secured Party. This 
agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the 
Debtor and shall inure to the benefit of the Seoured Party, its successors and assigns. 
I Signed and Delivered to Secured Party on the day and year first above written. 
- Security Agreement 
Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim 
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EXHIBIT A 
Vehicles 
1 Description 1 VIN # I 
I 6 - Security Agreement 
- - 
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Paae 210 I 
- - 
06603 5970 
C996015971 
A92603587 
T9103079015 iL 
99251150034 WI 
981 1822033-8 
0 16001 678 
B23988 1 
B1025101 
F076032 
D3005571 
737617373 
M2002037033 
01133104 
0 1 6020482 
5 10436 1 
A947085 
6909000S013 1 8 
- -- - 
1GNCSIBWO2K161159 
IMEBM60F94H67054 16 
IGCDC 14D2CS 143 942 
lAPTAC4S6X000790 
1 OT3R2NA7G1027370 
1 OT3R2HA2G1027292 
- 
2002 
1988 
1982 
1979 
1986 
1986 
- 
Chevrolet LL Blazer 
Mercury Cougar 2dr, 
Chevrolet C 10 Pickup 
Advance Concrete Mixer Trk 
Oshkosh Truck 1221 Red 
Oshkosh Truok 1 102 Red 
1985 
1968 
1978 
1982 
1969 
1968 
P 150 4x4 Ford PU redlwhite 
Chevrolct Camaro 2dr.YeIlow 
Triumph Motorcycle Bon 
Suzuki Motoroyle GS750EZ 
Chevrofet ChcvclIe 2dr, Blue 
Herd Top - 300 Deluxe 
1243 78L304483 
T14OVXX02778 
TS 1 GR7 1 A7C2103942 
1333792356989 
1 9 7 6  
1 990 
1960 
1970 
1970 
1939 
1969 
Chevrolet El Camino Pk. Yel, 13480821 5 1 188 
I 
~ficvrolec~hevdlc 2dr. Blok - 
KTM 300 BXC Motorcycle 
Chevrolet Sedan Biscayae 2dr 
Chcv Chevelle Ma1 4dr Green 
Chev Chevellc Mal. 4dr Gray 
Chemlet 2dr 
-- 
Chev Chevclle 2 dr 
1363%158374 
VBKEXK203LM400592 
01 1 1 I01 15665 
1 36390L189530 
136390L157625 
Motor #:2 189719 
SN; /4JAi215116 
1363792305384 
I 7 - Security Agreement 
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Title # 
C 166764 
No Title 
- 
CIS8291 
No Title 
GI 025275 
Dl375104 
h 
No Title 
No Title 
A-5703 15 
I395963287 
Year 
1939 
1955 
1956 
1956 
1956 
1965 
1966 
1966 
1967 
1968 
Descripti on 
Chevrolet Sedan 
Chev Station Wagon 
Chev Bcldre 4dr,Oreen/white 
Chev Belaire HT Green 4dr. 
ChcvroIet Tmck 
Chevrolet Impala 4dr. White 
Chevrolet Impala SW W t e  
Chevrolet C30 Truck Black 
Chevrolet Impala HT 2drGold 
Chevrolet El Camino Black 
Vl[N # 
2437403 
B55K098908 
VC56S 174786 
No Information 
L255K03 1878 
- 
164695 53 14997 
No Information 
No Information 
1 13 1 17W-185,341 
13680821 303 17 
Dl590391 1968 Chevrolet El Camino Blue 
--- -- 
No Title 
No Title 
EHS292 WA 
- 
B53792L - 
G505358 
524 1482 
LO03701 
1968 
1968 
1969 
. 4969 - _ 
1969 
1969 
1969 
H7HA951210135 
AZ 
B065 1 74 
No Title 
A95605838 
No Title 
No Title 
Chcvrolet El Camino Blu 
Chevrolet El Canxino 
Chev. Station Wagon Red 
1969 
1971 
1971 
1975 
1939 
1940 
136809K3 12523 
136801K115872 
No information 
Chevrolet El Camino Blue 
Chcvxolet CheveIle4drYellow 
Chev ChevcIIe Coupe 2dr Blu 
&eey Che~elle MalibuZdrRcd 
Chev Chavelle Malibu2drOre 
Chev Chcvelle Malibu2drBlu 
Chev Chevelte MaJibuZdrGre 
--
No Title 1 1960 OIdsmobilc 4dr. Blue No Information 
No Information 
No Idonnation 
133279B412898 
-l36229K4 13272 -- - 
1 353792329844 
13437923 17630 
13537923523 77 
Chcv El Camino Red 
Diamond T. Truck 
Federal Truck 
- 
1 C80HSR450652 
No information 
No Information 
-- . -- - - - -- - - 
Security Aerwmtnt 
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VIN # 
- 
No Information 
R-546,304 
No Information 
JH2H30301LK900647 
1,115,114 
No Information 
No Information 
- - 
No Information 
No Information 
No information 
No Information 
No Information 
No Information 
No Information 
Title # 
No Title 
F702641 
No Title 
Title Application 
1833 19 
No Title 
No Title 
No Title 
No Title 
- 
No Title 
No Title 
No Title 
- 
No Title 
No Title 
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Year 
1960 
1950 
1950 
1990 
1976 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1963 
1963 
1964 
1964 
1960 
Description 
Oldsmobile 4 dr. Green 
Studcbaker PU 2R5 
Studebaker PU 
Honda MB XRIDOR 
Honda Motorcycle XL125 
Semi flatbed Trailer 
Chcvrolet Impala 4 door 
Chevrolet Impala 4 door 
Chevrolet Impala 4 door 
Chevrolet Impala 4 door 
Chevrolet Impala 4 door 
Chevrolet Impala 4 door 
Chevrolct Impala 4 door 
Ford Pickup 
EXHIBIT B 
Personal Property 
All assets of Cary Sargent including but not limited to: 
1. 1600 Sq. A. Manufactured home - 2 bedroom, 2 bath with attached 2 car garage located at 
359 North 2400 East, St, Anthony, Idaho; 
I 2. 30 X 40 foot Shop located at the m e  location as the home; I 3. Furnishings and appliances located in the home; I 4. Ruger GPl 00.357 4" Revolver; 
5. Cameras and equipment as follows: 
a. Nikon 2000 35mm; 
b. Nikon 2002 35mm; 
c. Nikon 6006 35mm; 
d. Vxrious Lenses - 2 4 m ,  35-80mm, 75-300mm, 105mm, 300rnrn, and SOOmm; 
e, Nikon SE flash. 
6. Computers and Accessories: 
a Dell Computer; 
b. Dell laptop; 
c. HP Desk printer; 
- - -_.d,. .__ - Canon copier; and_ - - . - 
e. SmalI fax machine. 
7, Guitars and Accessories: 
a. BIack Fender Telecaster Electric 0uita.r; 
b. Red Fender Stratocaster Electric Guitar; 
c. Fender 2 12 Electric AmpIifier; 
d. Fender 39F Electric Amplifier; 
I .  8. Assorted camping gear including slcophg bags, tent, propane cookstove, lanterns, miscellmeous utensils, fishing poles and tackle. 
9, Air Compressors and accessories: 
a, Shop Air Compress&, 
b. Craftsman Portable Axlx Compressor; 
c. Small Portable Air Compressor; 
d. Auxiliary Air Tank; 
e. 2 Air Wrenches - 31%" and I/2 'I and sockets; 
f. lngersol Rand - Large Air Hammer; 
I 9 - Sseurlty Agroemont 
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g, Ingersol Rand - Large Air Wrench and Sockets (1 "); 
h. Air Hoses 
1. Air Chisels 
10. Wrenches and Tools: 
a. 1 set Large Craftsman Wrench Set (2004); 
b. 1 set Large Craftsman Socket Set (2004); 
c. 2 Full Rollaway Craftsman Tool Chests with Tools; 
I 1 1. 3 Paint spray gum and painting accessories: I 12. Body working and metal working tools; 
1 3. Welders and Accessories: 
a. MiIler 250 Dial Arc Stick Welder and leads (2007); 
b. Lincoln Portable Gas Engine Driven Stick Welder (2004); 
c. Lincoln 135T Mig Wire Feed (2007); 
d. 1 Cutting Toroh, goggles, and faceshield; 
e. 2 WeIding balmets; 
I 14. Debliss Pressure Washer with Honda motor; I 15. Coleman Genset (PIant Scales); 
All Miscellaneous Shop tools including: 
a .  Craftsmanfloor jacks; - - - -  .-- -- A - 
b. Jack Stands; 
c. Lug Wrenches; 
d. Milwaukco Grinder 4"; 
e, Milweukec Drill %"; 
f. Black and Decker Drill 318"; 
g. Bench Orinder; 
h. Log Chains; 
i. High Lift Jack; 
j 1 Parts washer; 
k. Smal I Sandblaster; 
1. 2 engine hoists; 
m. Bench grinder; 
n, Shelving 
o. Heavy Duty Battery Charger 
p. Bench type drill press 
Security Agmmen t 
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17. Miscellaneous Shop Supplies: 
a. Engine Oil; 
b. Hydraulic Oil; 
c. Gear Lube; 
d. Parts Cleaning Solvents; 
e. Grease Cartridges; 
f, Filters 
18. All Miscellaneous parts for work trucks, mixer trucks, mixers, and classic cars. 
19. Batch Plant - omce trailer 
End of Exhibit B 
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EXHIBIT C 
Accounts Receivable 
1. Any money received by Caty Sargent d/b/a Kickin Koncrete as a result of the concrete 
business of Cary Sargent. 
2 ,  All accounts receivable of Cary Sargent, d/b/a Kickin Koncrctc as a result of the concrete 
business of Cary Sargent. 
3. The proceeds from any accounts receivable owed to Cary Sargent d/b/a Kickin Koncxete. 
End of Exhlbit C 
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EXHIBIT D 
Judgments 
Any cause of action against Doyle Beck or the proceeds o f  any judgment obtained by Cary 
Sargent against Doyle Beck. 
End of Exhibit D 
13 - Security Agreement 
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EXHIBIT E 
All business assets of Cary Sargent d/b/a Kickin Koncrete including but not limited to: 
1. Business ofice equipment; 
2. Tools; 
3, LeasehoId interests; 
4. Parts; 
5 .  Equipment for the batching, mixing and delivery of concrete; 
6. Raw materials for batching concrete including but not limited to; 
a. Cement; 
b. Sand; 
c. Gravel; 
d, Aggregate; and 
e, Add-mix chemicals; 
7. Mixer trucks and parts; 
8. 1500 gallon water tank; ' 
9. Small engine Stand; 
10. Coleman Gcnset 
1 1. Offioe Trailer 
12. Fuel Tank & Stands; 
1 3. 4 Propane Tanks; 
14. 2 Portable Gas Heaters; 
15. Hydraulio Engine Hoist; 
16. Pressure Washer; 
17. 3 Air Compressors; _- 
-- -- 
- - -- --- .-  - - - -- -- 
-. - -  - 
18. ~ i l l e r  %O Dial Arc Stick Welder and leads (2007); 
19. Lincoln Portable Gas Engine Driven Stick Welder (2004); 
20. Lincoln 135T Mig Wire Peed (2007); 
End of Exhibit E 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB No. 441 1 
R. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISR No. 7010 
McGRATH, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. 0 .  Box 5073 1 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-073 1 
Telefax: (208) 529-4 166 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
D~STRICT SEVEN COURT 
county of Fremont State of Idaho 
Filed: 
clpR18am8 
E MACE, CLERK ' - 
By: Deputy Clerk 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
- 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
High Valley Concrete, L.L.C. ("High Valley") files this brief in support of its 
Case No. CV-02-0484 
BFUEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
CONTEST CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM OF 
EXEMPTION 
motion to challenge the joint efforts of the judgment-debtor, Cary Sargent ("Sargent"), and 
his lawyer, William D. Faler, to make Sargent judgment-proof on the eve of trial by 
arranging for Sargent to transfer a security interest in everything he owned to Faler's law 
firm, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC ("Faler's Firm"). For the reasons set forth 
more fully below, the court should grant High Valley's motion and deny Sargent's claim 
of exemption and Faler's Firm's third-party claim of exemption. 
---I- --- ------- -- ---,..---. m- -.r- FST CLAIM OF EXEiVIPTION AND THIRD- 
3rief in Support of Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and 
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11. BACKGROUND. 
On April 2,2008, High Valley caused the Bonneville and Fremont County Sheriffs 
offices to levy on Sargent's Amended Judgment in Fremont County Case No. CV-07-0118 
("Amended Judgment"). On April 1 1,2008, the Bonneville and Fremont County 
Sheriffs offices provided High Valley with a claim of exemption filed by Sargent and a 
third-party claim of exemption filed by Faler's Firm. 
The Amended Judgment is the only property that High Valley caused the sheriff 
to levy upon to date. Thus, the Amended Judgment is the only property at issue in this 
motion to contest the claims of exemption. 
Sargent claims an exemption in the following money and property: 
Wages or salary; 
Professional books; 
Homestead, house, mobile home, and related structures (manufactured 
home); 
Jewelry (Watch, rings); 
Car, truck or motorcycle (1968 Camaro); 
Tools of trade and implements (computer, welder, handtools); 
Appliances (household - refrigerator, freezer, microwave, washer and dryer, 
etc.); 
Furnishings (household - beds, couches, table, chairs, etc.); 
Firearms (Marlin 30130); 
Musical instruments (electric guitars); and 
Other property (tangible personal property consisting of cameras, photo 
printer, and scanner).' 
Importantly, Sargent claims no exemption in the Amended Judgment that High 
Valley levied upon.2 
1 See Claim of Exemption dated April 10, 2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to the Motion 
to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption filed concurrently herewith. 
See Claim of Exemption dated April 10,2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to the Motion 
to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption filed concurrently herewith. 
--- ----- ---.- EST CLAIM OF EXEMPTION AND THIRD- 
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Faler's Firm claims a third-party exemption in the Amended Judgment based on a 
security agreement dated January 26,2008, just 27 days before trial in this case, wherein 
Sargent purportedly grants Faler's Firm a security interest in "[alny cause of action against 
Doyle Beck or the proceeds of any judgment obtained by Cary Sargent against Doyle 
~ e c k , " ~  along with what appears to be all of Sargent's remaining property. Faler's Firm's 
third-party claim of exemption recites that the security agreement is to secure payment of 
$190,874.58 for legal fees and costs Faler's Firm provided to sargent4 
111. THE COURT SHOULD DENY SARGENT'S CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
BECAUSE SARGENT CLAIMS NO EXEMPTION FOR THE AMENDED 
JUDGMENT. 
Idaho Code Section 1 1-201 provides that all property of a judgment debtor "not 
exempt by law" is subject to execution. Section 11-203 sets forth the procedures for a 
judgment debtor to claim "that property levied upon is exempt." Specifically, the judgment 
debtor must complete and file a claim of exemption form identifyrng the exemption the 
judgment debtor claims for the property that was levied upon. I.C. 5 1 1-203; see also I.C. 5 
8-507C. The judgment debtor must deliver the completed claim of exemption form to the 
sheriff "within fourteen (14) days" after the sheriff levies on the judgment debtor's property. 
I.C. 5 1 1 -203(a). The judgment debtor must file the form with the sheriff within the 14-day 
period or "[tlhe sheriff shall refuse to accept or honor a claim not filed with him within that 
period . . ." I.C. 5 11-203(c). "Until a levy, property is not affected by the execution." I.C. 
' See Exhibit "D" to the Third-Party Claim of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. dated April 10, 
2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third- 
Party Claim of Exemption filed concurrently herewith. 
See the Third-Party Claim of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. dated April 10,2008, a copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of 
Exemption filed concurrently herewith. 
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Here, the sheriff levied on Sargent's Amended Judgment on April 2,2008. The 
sheriff has not yet levied on any of Sargent's other property. Sargent delivered his claim of 
exemption to the sheriff on April 10 or 11,2008. The claim of exemption does not identify 
any exemption applicable to the Amended Judgment or any reason that the Amended 
Judgment is "exempt by law" from execution.' I.C. 5 1 1-201. As such, Sargent has failed 
to identify any reason the Amended Judgment is exempt from execution. Because Sargent 
has failed to show the Amended Judgment Sargent is "exempt by law" from execution, the 
court should grant High Valley's motion. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD DENY FALER'S FIRM'S THIRD-PARTY CLAIM OF 
EXEMPTION BECAUSE FALER7S FIRM'S SECURITY INTEREST IN 
SARGENT7S AMENDED JUDGMENT IS AN UNLAWFUL TRANSFER AS TO 
HIGH VALLEY. 
Under its express terms, Idaho's LJniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, I.C. $ 5  55-91 0 
thru 55-920, "shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make 
uniform the law with respect to the subject of this act among states enacting it." I.C. 5 55- 
920. Among the other states enacting the UFTA, courts explain that "[blecause the 
Fraudulent Transfer Act is remedial in naturc, it should be liberally construed." Nat ' I  Loan 
Investors, L. P. v. Givens, 952 P.2d 1067, 1069 (Utah 1998). "The purpose of the Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act is primarily for the benefit of creditors, not grantees. It is a 
remedial statute and a liberal construction should be given it to accomplish its purpose of 
giving speedy relief against a fraudulent debtor." Running v. Widdes, 190 N.W.2d 169, 
172 (Wis. 1971); see also Mullens v. Frazer, 59 S.E.2d 694 (W.Va. 1950) (act is to be 
liberally interpreted for suppression of fraud); Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 282 N.W. 661 
5 See Claim of Exemption dated April 10, 2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to the Motion 
to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption filed concurrently herewith. 
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(Minn. 1938). Thus, for Idaho to make the UFTA "uniform . . . among the states 
enacting it', as expressly required by Section 55-920, this court should liberally construe 
the UFTA to provide "speedy relief against a fraudulent debtor." Running, supra. 
Section 55-914(2) of the UFTA provides, "A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent 
as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to 
an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had 
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent." One Idaho appellate court 
summarized the unlawfbl transfer analysis of Section 55-914(2) as follows: 
The inquiry whether a transfer of assets is fraudulent under section 
55-914(2) is satisfied by affirmative answers to the following elements: (1) 
Did the creditor's claim arise before the transfer was made? (2) Was the 
transfer made to an insider? (3) Was the transfer made for an antecedent 
debt? and (4) Was the debtor insolvent at the time the transfer was made and 
did the insider have reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was 
insolvent? 
Alcan Building Products, a Division ofAIcun Aluminum Corporation v. Peoples, 124 Idaho 
338, 340-341 (Ct.App. 1993). How each of the four requirements of Section 55-914(2) is 
satisfied is discussed below. 
A. High Valley's Claim Against Sargent Arose Before Sargent Transferred The 
Security Interest In The Amended Judgment To Faler's Firm. 
The security agreement whereby Sargent transferred a security interest in the 
Amended Judgment to Faler's Firm is dated January 26,2008.~ High Valley's claims 
against Sargent arose in February 2002,' nearly six years before Sargent transferred the 
security interest to Faler's Firm. Thus, High Valley's claim against Sargent arose long 
See Third-Party Claim of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. dated April 10, 2008, a copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of 
Exemption filed concurrently herewith. 
7 See High Valley's Complaint, Amended Complaint, and Second Amended Complaint, already on file 
with the court. 
-------- - - - 
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before Sargent decided to transfer the security interest in thc Amended Judgment to Faler's 
Firm. Sargent had been well-aware of High Valley's claim for years before he, with the aid 
of his lawyer, attempted to make himselfjudgment-proof on the eve of trial. 
B. Sargent's Transfer Was Made To Faler's Firm As An Insider. 
Idaho's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA") contains various definitions of 
the term "insider," all of which focus on the close relationship between the transferee and 
the judgment debtor. The definition includes "a managing agent of the debtor." I.C. 5 55- 
91 0(7)(d). The UFTA does not define the term "managing agent." However, liberally 
construing the statutory definition of insider under the UFTA as this court must, and 
drawing from the treatment of "insiders" under the bankruptcy law upon which the UFTA is 
based, Faler is clearly Sargent7s "managing agent" and therefore an insider. 
Black's Law Dictionary explains, "In the most general sense this term [attorney] 
denotes an agent or substitute, or one who is appointed and authorized to act in the place or 
stead of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 128 (6th ed. 1990). Black's Law Dictionary 
defines "managing agent" as "[a] person who is invested with general power, involving the 
exercise of judgment and discretion, as distinguished from an ordinary agent or employee, 
who acts in an inferior capacity, and under the direction and control of superior authority, 
both in regard to the extent of the work and Ihe manner of executing the same." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 64 (6th ed. 1990). 
Many sections of the UFTA, including the definition of "insider," are patterned after 
the bankruptcy code. In fact, the UFTA definition of "insider" is nearly identical to the 
bankruptcy code's definition. Compare I.C. 5 55-91 O(7) and 1 1 U.S.C. 5 101(3 1); see also 
Fidelity Bond & Mort. Co. v. Brand, 371 B.R. 708,719 (E.D.Pa. 2007) (citing Michael L. 
- - - - - - - - - -. -- - - - - - - - - 
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Cook and Richard E. Mendales, The Uniform Fraudulent Tran.der Act: An Introductory 
Critique, 62 Am. Bankr.L.J. 87, 87 (1 988) ("When drafting the model Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act, the authors [of the UFTA] looked to the federal Bankruptcy Code for 
guidance. . . . many provisions in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act were modeled on 
the Bankruptcy Code")). 
The legislative history on the "insider" definition states, "An insider is one who has 
a sufficiently close relationship with the debtor that his conduct is made subject to closer 
scrutiny than those dealing at arms length with the debtor." In re Sky Valley, Inc., 135 B.R. 
925,934 (N.D.Ga. 1992) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 595,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 312 (1977); 
S.Rep. No. 989,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1978) U.S.Code Cong. & Adrnin.News 1978 pp. 
5787, 58 10,6267). One court explained, "[Tlhe 'insider7 definition must be flexibly applied 
'to include a broad range of parties who have a close relationship with the Debtor." In re 
Main, Inc., 21 3 B.R. 67,81 (E.D.Pa. 1997). Another court pointed out that courts have 
"uniformly held" that the statutory definition of insider "is merely illustrative" and "must be 
flexibly applied on a case-by-case basis." Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 175 B.R. 
438,499 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). "The court must closely examine the claimant's relationship to 
the debtor to determine whether the claimant has used an opportunity to adjust its position in 
such a way that other creditors are prejudiced." In re Beverages Int 'I, Ltd., 50 B.R. 273,281 
(Mass. 1985). Few relationships are closer than the fiduciary relationship between attorneys 
and clients. "The relationship of client and attorney is one of trust, binding an attorney to 
the utmost good faith in fair dealing with his client, and obligating the attorney to discharge 
that trust with complete fairness, honor, honesty, loyalty, and fidelity." Blough v. Wellman, 
132 Idaho 424,426 (1 999). 
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Under either the statutory definition of "managing agent of the debtor," or the more 
liberal analysis focusing on the closeness of the relationship between the transferee and the 
debtor, Faler's Firm is clearly an insider under the UFTA. Faler served as Sargent's 
attorney throughout the past six years of this litigation. Faler is not merely an agent "who 
acts in an inferior capacity," but is a managing agent "invested with general power, 
involving the exercise ofjudgment and discretion," to defend Sargent against High Valley's 
claims and to prosecute Sargent's claim against Doyle Beck. Faler has managed Sargent's 
claims and now manages the very Amended Judgment High Valley has levied upon. 
Faler has a "sufficiently close relationship" with Sargent that his conduct is subject 
to much closer scrutiny than others dealing with Sargent at arms length. Faler has extended 
Sargent credit for more than $190,000 in legal fees and costs.8 Then, on the eve of trial, 
undoubtedly realizing that High Valley could receive a sizeable judgment against his client, 
Faler took advantage of his insider information and arranged for his firm to receive a 
security interest in the Amended Judgment and thereby "adjust[ed] its position in such a 
way that other creditors [like High Valley] are prejudiced." Beverages, supra. Faler acted 
on this insider knowledge to secure his own debt and leave Sargent judgment proof. 
Sargent7s transfer of a security interest in what appears to be all of his property to 
Faler's Firm is not an arms-length transaction because Faler is not just any "ordinary 
creditor." Faler owes Sargent a fiduciary duty of utmost loyalty and good faith, a duty that 
binds him "with the strictest accountability and fidelity to his client's interests." Matter of 
Lutz, 100 Idaho 45'49 (1 979) (emphasis added). Out of all the creditors Sargent chose to 
See the Third-Party Claim of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. dated April 10,2008, a copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of 
Exemption filed concurrently herewith. 
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prefer at the time he is insolvent and High Valley's claim is pending, he chooses Faler, the 
one person that is duty-bound to place Sargent's interests ahead of his own. 
As a result of the security agreement, Sargent and Faler both have an interest in 
Sargent's property. To the extent there is a conflict between Faler's interest and Sargent's 
interest, Faler must put Sargent's interests ahead of his own. However, Faler and Sargent 
both benefit from the security agreement to the prejudice of other creditors. Faler uses his 
inside information to place his interests ahead of other creditors. Sargent makes himself 
judgment-proof by granting a security interest to the one creditor that must place Sargent's 
interests ahead of his own. In the meantime, Sargent continues to live in his house, drive his 
cars, and operate his business while relying on the security interest to his attorney-agent 
Faler to block the collection efforts of creditors like High Valley. This is exactly the type of 
fraudulent arrangement between a debtor and an "insider" that Idaho Code Section 55- 
9 14(2) is designed to remedy 
C. Sargent's Transfer Of The Security Interest Was Made For An Antecedent 
Debt To Faler's Firm. 
Faler's Firm's third-party claim of exemption specifically recites that the security 
agreement "was made to secure payment for legal fees and costs incurred as a result of legal 
representation provided by [Faler's Firm] to [Sargent]" in the amount of $1 90,874.58 "as 
submitted in Sargent's Motion, Memorandum, and Affidavit for Fees in [sic] Costs in both 
 matter^."^ Thus, Sargent's transfer of the security interest in the Amended Judgment was 
based on an antecedent debt to Faler's Firm. 
see Third-Party Claim of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. dated April 10,2008, a copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of 
Exemption filed concurrently herewith. 
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D. Sargent Was Insolvent At The Time The Transfer Was Made And Faler's 
Firm Had Reasonable Cause To Believe That Sargent Was Insolvent. 
Idaho's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides that "[a] debtor who is generally 
not paying his . . . debts as they become due is presumed to be insolvent." I.C. tj 55-91 l(2). 
Here, the record provides clear examples that Sargent was "generally not paying his 
debts" as they became due at the time he transferred the security interest to Faler's Firm. 
First, Sargent was obviously not paying his debts to Faler's Firm as they became due 
because the third-party claim of exemption recites that Sargent owes Faler's Firm 
$190,874.58. Sargent owed a significant portion of this debt as of January 26,2008, when 
he transferred the security interest to Faler's Firm. Sargent had made no payment to Faler's 
Firm in six years.'0 Second, Sargent has not been paying on the $41'8 16.77 debt he has 
owed to Glendale Construction, Inc. since April 2004." Sargent was not generally paying 
his debt to Glendale in June 2006 when High Valley deposed Kim Allen about the debt.'* 
Sargent was not generally paying this debt at the time of trial because Sargent admitted that 
he still owed Glendale for the debt. Additionally, Sargent has not paid anyhng to High 
Valley on hls $123,326.30 debt from the judgment entered in this case. Finally, Sargent has 
not been paying his taxes current having paid his 200 1 federal taxes on or about December 
12,2007--one month before Sargent signed the security agreement.13 
Equally clear is the fact that Faler's Firm had reasonable cause to believe that 
Sargent was insolvent at the time he gave the security interest to Faler's Firm. As Sargent's 
10 See billing statements attached as exhibits to Motion, Memorandum of Fees and Costs and Affidavit for 
Attorney Fees and Costs on Behalf of Cary Sargent in Both the Matter of Sargent v. Beck and in the Matter 
of High Valley Concrete, LLC v. Sargent, dated February 2 1 ,  2008, already on file with the court. 
1 I See High Valley Trial Exhibit #28 and the trial testimony of Cary Sargent and Kim Allen. 
l2  See Kim Allen Depo., pp. 126-132 attached to the Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated April 18,2008 as 
Exhibit "A." 
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attorney, Faler knew that Sargent was not generally paying his debts to Faler's Firm as they 
came do. Faler also had actual knowledge that Sargent was not paying his debts to Glendale 
because Faler attended Kim Allen's deposition in June 2006 where she testified that Sargent 
had not paid anything on his debt to Glendale. However, the best evidence that Faler had 
reasonable cause to believe that Faler was insolvent is the existence of the very security 
agreement that Faler's Firm relies on for its third-party claim of exemption. The fact that 
Faler's Firm received a security interest in not just one or two items of Sargent's property, 
but in arguably all of Sargent's present and hture assets, undisputedly shows that Faler had 
reasonable cause to believe that Sargent was insolvent. If Faler did not believe Sargent was 
insolvent, he would not have required the security agreement in the first place (unless Faler 
merely wanted to make his client judgment proof). 
E. The Court Has Broad Power To Deny Faler's Firm's Third-Party Claim Of 
Exemption In The Amended Judgment. 
Under the UFTA, the remedies available to a creditor-victim of a fraudulent transfer 
are extremely broad. For example, a creditor may obtain "[alvoidance of the transfer or 
obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim" or "any other relief the 
circumstances may require." I.C. tj 55-916. "Avoidance of the transfer" or "[alny other 
relief' necessarily includes denial of a third-party claim of exemption. Thus, this court has 
the power and authority to deny Faler's Firm's third-party claim of exemption and pennit 
High Valley to proceed with execution on the Amended Judgment. 
l 3  See Cary Sargent's 2001 federal income tax return attached to the Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated 
April 18,2008 as Exhibit "B." 
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V. CONCLUSION. 
Base on the foregoing, the court should grant High Valley's motion and deny the 
claim of exemption and the third-party claim of exemption. 
DATED this /y Qof April7 2008. 
McGRATH, SMITH & 
BY: . 
Bryan D. Smit 
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an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-02-484 
) 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF 
BRYAN D. SMITH 
) 
) 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
> ss 
County of Bonneville 1 
I, Bryan D. Smith, state and declare the following under oath: 
1. 1 am over the age of 21, 1 represent the plaintiff, and 1 make this affidavit 
based on my personal knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "A" are true and correct copies of 
the cover page and pages 126-1 32 of the transcript of the deposition of Kim Allen taken 
June 14, 2006 showing that as of that date Cary Sargent had paid nothing on his 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith 
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$41,8 16.77 debt he has owed to Glendale Construction since at least February 2004. See 
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit #28. 
3. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of 
Cary Sargent's 2001 federal income tax 1040 form dated December 12, 2007 showing 
that Cary Sargent owed $1,302 federal income tax for 2001. 
Further your affiant $ay~th  naught. 
/ e A p r i l ,  2008. DATED this 
Bryan D. Smi  
Attorneys for fiaintiff 
/@day of jlpril, 2008. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before rnf this 
~ e s i d i n ~  at Idaho ~all ;  Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 0411 111 1 
lffidavit of Bryan 0. Smith 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /6fi-of April, 2008 1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D. SMITH to be served by 
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight delivery, addressed to 
the following: 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
William D. Faler, Esq. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN 
& CRAPO, PLLC 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
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Widavit 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., An ) 
Idaho Limited Liability Company, 1 
Plaintiff, 1 
vs. ) Case No. CV-02-1279 
CARY SARGENT, 1 
Defendant. ) 
DEPOSITION OF KIM ALLEN 
JUNE 14, 2006 
REPORTED BY: 
DIANA KILPATRICK, CSR No. 727, RPR 
of Bryan D. Smith 
'age 235 
I P a g e  1 0  
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. And what is your official title? 
3 A. Bookkeeper. 
4 Q. And what bookkeeping experience did you 
5 have before going to work for Glendale that 
6 qualified you for the job? 
7 A. I have worked in lumber yards doing the 
8 same; invoices, accounts receivable, accounts 
9 payable, for many years before that, since I was 
1 0  a sophomore in high school. 
1 1 Q. What year did you graduate from high 
1 2  school? 
1 3  A. 1992. 
1 4  Q. So how many years' experience have you 
15 had with accounts receivable, accounts payable, 
1 6 invoicing and that kind of work? 
1 7 A. Probably about 14. 
1 8  Q. And the last six of those years have 
1 9 been at Glendale? 
2 0 A. Yes, they have. 
2 1 Q. Who has been primarily responsible for 
2 2 doing all the bookkeeping at Glendale for the 
2 3 last six years? 
2 4 A. Myself. 
2 5 Q. Anybody else help you? 
P a g e  11 
A. Joan Sluder. 
2 Q. What does she do there? 
3 A. She's the secretary of the company. 
4 She signs all of the payroll checks, any kind of 
5 checks I need signed. Any legal things she 
7 Q. What kind of legal he things? 
8 A. Or banking statements, anything like 
9 that. She does all of that. Then she just 
1 0 assists getting the money, the deposits. When I 
11 get money in we discuss where it needs to go, 
1 2  that sort of thing. 
1 3  Q. Please, if you could, give me a brief 
1 4  description of your job duties. 
1 5  A. Okay. I take care of -- well, sand and 
1 6  gravel, we weigh the trucks in and out. I do all 
1 7  the invoices for loads that go in and out; I 
1 8  price all of the invoices and do the monthly 
1 9  billing on the accounts receivable side; I 
2 0 receive all the payables and enter them into the 
2 1 computer also; I do all the banking deposits and 
2 2 bank reconciliations, and I do payroll. Then 
2 3 just regular office duties of the phone and 
2 4 filing and pretty much all of it in there. 
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1 with duties that belong to Joan Sluder? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Which ones overlap? 
4 A. Taking care of the accounts payable. 
5 She -- anything that I pay -- you know, I receive 
6 all of the invoices, but anything that I pay, I 
7 converse with her first and she tells me which 
8 ones that she wants me to write the checks out 
9 for. And then I do that, we go over them and she 
1 0  signs all the checks. 
11 Q. And how does she determine which ones 
12  she wants to write checks out for and which ones 
1 3  she doesn't? 
1 4  A. I don't know how she determines. I 
1 5  present to her what we have, what needs to be 
1 6  paid, and we walk over them, which ones need to 
17  be paid most importantly and we take care of 
18  those first. 
1 9  Q. Has anyone trained you to do your work 
2 0 in the Glendale way, so to speak? 
21  A. No. 
2 2 Q. Have you then used your training and 
2 3 experience before getting to Glendale to carry 
2 4 forward in the way you do accounts payable, 
2 5 accounts receivable, etcetera? 
P a g e  13 
1 A. Yes. 
(Exhibit No. 1 Marked.) 
3 BY MR. SMITH: 
4 Q. I'm going to hand you what's been 
5 marked as Exhibit 1, Kim. This is a copy of the 
6 Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tec 
f 7 Did you got a copy of this before today? 1 8 A. Yes, I did. 
4 (Pages 10 to 13) 
I Page 1 2 6  
1 Q. Did you prepare this one, too? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. It looks like this is just for payroll. 
4 Correct? 
5 A. Correct. 
6 Q. The total amount due was $38,662.29? 
7 A. Correct. 
8 Q. Did Cary ever pay that? 
9 A. No. 
10  Q. And without being repetitive, is there 
11 any computer invoice to reflect the amounts 
1 2  contained on that last payroll statement? 
1 3  A. No. 
1 4  Q. And this was also done outside of the 
1 5  ordinary business practice of maintaining 
1 6 accounts receivables on the computer? 
1 7  A. Yes. 
1 8  Q. He never paid any of it? 
1 9  A. No. 
2 0 Q. Do you know how much Cary Sargent owes 
2 1 Glendale Construction? 
2 2  A. What I have is this amount. 
2 3  Q. $38,662.29? 
2 4  A. Correct. 
25 Q. At a minimum? 
- --- .- 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Are there other things that he owes for 
that you know of?? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. Have you heard about them? 
A. No. 
Q. We're down to the last stack, kind of. 
(Exhibit No. 1 1 Marked.) 
BY MR. SMITH: 
Q. Here's Exhibit 1 1. 
A. Okay. 
Q. It's dated October 17th, 2002. What is 
this? 
A. This is a check. I had not normally 
listed it out as seen in the previous exhibits 
where I broke it down for him. I pulled a copy 
off of my computer and sent it to him that way, 
broken down rather than breaking it down on an 
actual letterhead. 
Q. So this is, again, a statement? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And showing what, an account 
receivable? 
A. This is just showing those two weeks, 1 2 5 what we paid to him. 
~ f f i d a v i t a r ~ a n  D. Smith 
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1 Q. Are these numbers rolled into that 
2 Exhibit 10 somehow? 
3 A. I believe so. Let me look. Yes, they 
4 are. 
5 Q. They are? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 (Exhibit No. 12 Marked.) 
8 BY MR. SMITH: 
9 Q. Please take a look at Exhibit 12. 
10  A. Yes. 
11 Q. This appears to be an additional 
1 2  typewritten statement that you sent to Cary about 
13 February 23rd of '04. 
1 4  A. Correct. 
15  Q. Now, it shows amounts for County, 
16  Property Tax and Insurance on the Cement Trucks? 
17 A. Yes. And I did forget about, when you 
18 asked on that one, we did -- this was the 
1 9  property tax that we were paying for the plant to 
2 0 be there. 
2 1 Q. Okay. So it looks like Doug did have 
2 2 you invoice him for the property tax for the 
2 3 batch plant and also the insurance -- 
2 4  A. On the truck. That's correct. 
2 5 Q. Does that refresh your recollection as 
---".~-- 
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1 to whether or not Cary was using some trucks 
2 owned by Glendale? 
3 A. I don't know if they were Glendale's 
4 trucks or if they were on our insurance. I was 
5 just told that these trucks were on our 
6 insurance. I have insurance cards for them, and 
7 Doug told me to bill them out. 
8 Q. Have you ever seen any invoices, 
9 written or computerized, relating to any trucks? 
10  A. No. 
11 Q. Then it looks like the balance at the 
12 end of November of '04, plus the amounts 
13 contained in this statement of February 23rd of 
1 4  '04, total $41,816.77. 
1 5  A. Correct. 
1 6  Q. Then there's this statement that says, 
17 "If at all possible, could you please send us 
18  some kind of payment on this account?" 
1 9  A. Yes. 
2 0 Q. Why did you include that in there if 
2 1 Doug was just working it out? 
2 2 A. Because we were trying -- he told me he 
2 3 was working it out, and I asked if there would be 
2 4 a payment sent, and he said that I could ask him 
2 5 if there was any way he could send a payment. 
-., * ,- ?P dam*--, "im *m- a. - * * W A " i  *L w ~ m - - \  -Lwx Y e - -  %we5 
33 (Pages  126 to 129) 
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Page 130 Page 132 
1 Q. And then on April 20th you sent him a 
2 letter, and restating that he owed $41,8 16.77? 
3 A. Correct. 
4 Q. And then you again tell him, "It would 
5 be greatly appreciated if you could send some 
6 money." 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Did Doug tell you to do that? 
9 A. Yes. 
1 0  Q. Was Doug upset that Cary wasn't paying 
11 him? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. And then you say, "We understand that 
1 4  times are tough and that you are just getting 
1 5  started again." What does that mean? 
1 6  A. That through the winter months, that he 
1 7  wasn't running through the winter months. We 
1 8  also were slow, and that is why we were asking 
1 9  for some. We know from experience it's tough to 
4ffidavit of Bryan D. Smith 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. So as the bookkeeper for Glendale 
3 Construction, as you sit here today, is it your 
4 understanding that the balance owed by Cary is 
5 the $4 1,8 16.77? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Are you aware of any other sums that 
8 Cary owes Glendale Construction? 
9 A. The only other ones would be the 
1 0  property tax for 200412005, and 200512006. 
11 Q. Did you ever invoice him for those? 
12 A. No. 
1 3  Q. And those would be less than a couple 
1 4  hundred bucks? 
1 5  A. Correct. 
1 6  Q. Let's just take a break for a second. 
17  I believe I may have just a couple more 
1 8  questions. I think I'm done. Then I'll give you 
1 9  the homework assignments. 
1 A. No. 
2 Q. Was that written off! 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. What's happening with that account 
5 receivable? 
34 (Pages 130 to 133) 
1 Q. And how far back do the data files go? 
2 A. I'm not positive exactly. Invoices for 
3 customers, I can go back -- I've had to look back 
4 to, like, '98, and I can pull up that 
5 information. Anything banking wise, it doesn't 
2 0 get started back in the spring. 
2 1 Q. Okay. What about '05 and '06? Did you 
2 2 ever bill him for those amounts that are owed? 
2 3  A. No. 
2 4 Q. Did you ever send him statements or 
2 5 billings saying, "Hey, what about the $4 1 ,OOO?ll 
-- 
6 A. Nothing that I know of. 6 let me in. 
7 Q. Why aren't you billing him? I  7 Q. All right. Let's just go over your 
8 A. Since Doug's passing, we have not done 8 homework assignment. Do you have a pen? 
9 any of them. It's come up in conversation with 9 A. I don't. Thank you. 
1 0  Joan that we need to contact Cary and we need to 1 0  Q. You were going to look up the invoices 
11 get something worked out, but we have not done 11 for the cement deliveries on the first page of 
1 2  so. 
1 3  Q. Does Joan understand that the only 
1 4  amount that's owed is that $41,000? Q. Then you were going to look up when the 
1 5  A. She knows that's the balance on there. 
1 6 Yes. After that, she knows we've done the 
1 7  property tax, but that would be it. 1 17 Q. And you were going to look up to see if 
1 8  Q. Are you aware of any payments by Cary 1 8  the $970 check ever got deposited. 1 1 9  A. Okay. 1 9  to Glendale Construction for use of the trucks, 
2 0 any kind of trucks, owned by Glendale 2 0 Q. Then there was a $20,000 check dated 
2 1 Construction? I 2 1 January 7th, 1999. You were going to see if you 
22 A. I'm not aware of any. I 22 could find what the invoice was for that, and 2 3 Q. Are you aware of any payments by Cary 2 3 whether it was deposited. Then there were those 
2 4 to Glendale Construction for a batch plant, 2 4 three checks: One for 3,000 to Kirk; 1,000, I 
2 5 either a purchase or a lease or anythmg? 1 25 think it's going to be to Cary; one to, I think 
.--or % *1""**4- >'?+Znartu~*w ,A dYM,-" ' rPCw'l  l r , , x m . % T e w h Y  W W P  *i *ib \w\!wm .* v * a ~ ~ 4 * i  e n , <  VI ' \*nr*?w<* <**'"r'%e*rr-% i %.%"*w'~-~c~-i.rrx**~<~&w~* X ramL ?A "<!,en "I 
2 0  A. Okay. 
2 1 (A Break Was Taken.) 
22 BY MR. SMITH: 
2 3  Q. How long has Glendale Construction been 
2 4 using QuickBooks? 
2 5 A. I do not -- ever since I've been there. 
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Department of the Treasury -- Internal Revenue Service 
Form 1040 U.S. Individual income Tax Return 2001 (99) IRS use only -- DO notmi te  or  staplein this space. 
For the year Jan. 1-Dec. 31.2001, or othertax year beginning ,2001. ending .20  Use 1 OMS NO. 1545-0074 
the 
IRS k 
label. 
Other- 
wise, 
please 
o r t v ~ e . ~  
CARY SARGENT 
PO BOX 3 2 1  
S a i n t  Anthony ID 83445 
Your soclal securlty number 
 
Spouse's social security no. 
 
A YOU must enter A 
your SSN(S) above. 
1 Note. Checking "Yes" will not change your tax or reduce your refund. You Spouse Presldential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ElecUon a m p a l g n  DO you, or your spouse if filing a joint return, want $3 to go to thii fund? n Yes No n Yes n No 
Single 
Married filing joint return (even if only one had income) 
Married filing separate return. Enter spouse's S S N  above h full name hers. bDARLA SARGENT 
Head of household (with qualifying person). (See instructions.) If the qualifying person is a child but not your dependent, 
enter child's name here. b 
Qualifying widow(er) with dependent child (yr. spouse died* ). (See instructions.) 
1 
Filing Status 2 
3 
Check only 4 
one box. 
5 
Exemptions da and 6b 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11 Alimnyreceived 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 Business income or (loss). Attach Schedule C or C-EZ. 
. . . .  13 Capital gain or (loss). Attach Schedule O if required. If not required. check here C 
b Taxable amount (see inst.) . . 
ScheduleF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . .  24 Student loan interest deduction (see instructions) Gross 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  25 Archer MSA deduction. Altach Form 8853. Income 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26 Moving expenses. Attach Form 3903. 
27 Om-half of self-employment tax. Attach Schedule SE . . . .  
28 Self-employed health insurance deduction (see instructions) . 
. . . . . . .  29 Self-employed SEP, SIMPLE, and qualified plans. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30 Penalty on early withdrawal of savings. 
3 la nrrnony paid b Recipient's SSN b 
1 104012 
NTF 2554184 
Copvrioht 2001 
!e Instructions. CAA 
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- 
X 
- 
- 
Form 1040 (2001) SARGENT  Page 2 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Tax and 34 Amount from llne 33 (adjusted gross income) 59,857 
Credits 358 Check if: 0 You were 65,oider. 0 Blind; 0 Spouse was 65 or older. 0 Blind. 
Standard 
Deduction 
for -- 
............. Add the number of boxes checked above and enter the total here 35a 
b If you are married filing separately and your spouse Iternlzes deductlons, or you 
- were a dual-status alien, see instructions and check here. ................... 35b 
People who 
....... checked 36 ltemked deductions (from Schedule A) or your standard deduction (see left margin) 
.................................................... any On '37 Subtract line 36 from line 34. line 35a or 
35b or who 38 If line 34 is $99,725 or less, multiply $2,900 by the total number of exemptions claimed on 
can be 
................... claimed as line 6d. If line 34 is over $99,725, see the worksheet in the instructions. 
. . . . . .  39 Taxable Income. Subtract line 38 from line 37. If line 38 is more than line 37, enter -0-. see ~nst. 
IUl others: 40 Tax (see inst). Check if any tax is from a 0 Form(s) 8814 b 0 Form 4972. . . . . . . . . .  
......................... Sin le 41 Alternative mlnlmum tax (see instructions). Attach Form 6251. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $4,%d 42 Add lines 40 and 41. 
.36 
......>... 37 
&z2;s$. p''! 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
12,124 
47,733 
11,600 
36,133 
7,109 
7,109 
Head of 
household, 
$6,650 
Married 
$7,600 
Manjed 
filing 
$3.800 
43 Foreign tax credit. Attach Form 11 16 it requlred. . . . . . . . . . . . .  
44 Credit for child & dependent care expenses. Attach Form 2441 
45 Credit for the elderly or the disabled. Attach Schedule R . . . . . .  
46 Education credits. Attach Fonn 8863 ..................... 
47 Rate reduction credit. See the worksheet in the instructions ... 
48 Child tax credit (see Instructions). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
49 Adoption credit. Attach Form 8839. ...................... 
50 Other credits from: Form 3801) b [l ~ o r m  8396 
C 0 Form8801 
51 Add lines 43 through 50. These are your total credits.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
52 Subtract line 51 from line 42. If line 51 is more than line 42, enter 4-. ................... 
......................................... Other 53 Self-employment tax. Attach Schedule SE. 
Taxes 54 Social security and Medicare tax on tip income not reported to employer. Attach Form 4137 . . .  
55 Tax on qualifmd plans, including IRAs, & other tax-favored accts. Attach Form 5329 if required 
........................... 56 Advance earned income credit payments from Form(s) W-2. 
................................... 57 Household employment taxes. Anach Schedule H. 
58 Add lines 52 through 57. This is your total tax. ..................................... 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
........ 49
... ........ $:$&$ .> v 
, 50 . 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
350 
6,759 
2,402 
29 
9,190 
7 8 8 8 x$i:':FgI, I 'A'. '. .>.+:. :'.F;>< w,:s.:.:.< 
...... .,..,... 
...... ..,.... 
*.?%-: 
.,., ........ r>3*?i'?i 
........... 
*.:g!s$ ;.:.:.: 
........ -.- q*::<.:..<., 
. .:.$',$; :gs$j$ 
:z:::;*x 
........... 
..:.., >>, 
q&@ <s:>$:k. . 
.... .... 
..,.. 55 
.. ::$%:?<% 
.......... 
:$- 
..... '. r....). :;?$$$$$$$$ 
59 Federal income tax withheld from Forms W-2 and 1099 . . . . . .  
2001 estimated tax payments & amt. applied from 2000 return . 
Earned Income credit (EIC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Nontaxable earned income . 161 b ( 
Excess social security and RRTA tax withheld (see instructions) 
1 104012 63 Additional child tax credit. Attach Form 8812. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
NTF2554185 64 Amount paid with request for extension to file (see instructions) 
Copyright 2001 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ d , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  65 Other payments. Check if from a 0 Form 2439 b 0 Form4136 
59 
60 
61a 
.;.:..:.:.:.:.:.:.; :<.$>:.+:+ 
:.:<<.:.:<.:g.:: 
.:.:.:.:.>> ...... 
62 
63 
64 
65 
7,888 LP-Forms software Only 66 Add lines 59, 60, 61 a, and 62 through 65. These are your total payments ................ 66 
0 
.. 
~~fu,.,d 67 I f  line 66 is more than line 58, subtract line 58 from line 66. This Is the amount you overpaid. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
67 
688 Amount of line 67 you want refunded to you 68a Direct 
deposit? . b Routing no. 
See b d Account no. 
and fil l in 68b, 
68~. and 68d. 69 Amt. of line 67 you want applle 
Amount 70 Amount you owe. Subtract li 
YOU Owe 71 Estimated tax penalty. Also in 
. .  Third Party Do you want lo allow another person to discus this return with the IRS (see instructions)?. U Yes. Complete the following. W No 
Designee ,O.";gnee"' . Phone . Persona Jfptification no. number ) . .... . . . . . . . . .  
Sign Underpenalties of perjury I declare that l have examined this return mdaccompanyingschedulesandstatements and to the best of my knowledgeand belief. 
1 
they are true, correct, and'complete. Declaration of preparer(other than taxpayer)is based on all information of which preparer has any knowledge. 
Here Your signature 
Joint return? 
See instructions. 
Keep a copy spouse's signature. ~f a joint return. both must sign. for your 
records. 
Your occupation 
Spouse's occupation 
Date 
Date 
Daytime phone number 
A,... .., .... :...:.:.:;;::.>:<.::.r ................. .,., . 
...... cs&s$$&.> ,.,,. <... ;?5*>*.:&Tg<g 
~ ~ ~ j $ ~ $ $ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ $ ~ < ~ ~  
: . ; . x . ~ . : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ . ~ : ~ . : ~ . :  zsKE +i,h? ,yTy+:.:.:.::$ ...:< : :.,x? ....<.>:,:.:,:, g 
................. ........... .Y< < 
..... 
........... ~p>:-:.>.:.;~:x:$~~.:.:~:<~<:<<:::~~.:.:.:<.> 
Preparer's SSN or PTlN 
PO 0 - 0 0 - 2 6 90 
Pre~arer's lo MAN SUTTON ~ ( s I ~ ~ M O ~ S  PA E1~20-0561324 
; PLAZA 
L 0 08-356-3452 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith Preparers Edition Form 1040 (2001) 
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Check if 
self-employed n Paid signature Prepare? Date /L/~ >.aP 
District Seven Court 
William D. Faler, Esq. County of Fremont 
Idaho State Bar No. 1464 Sta@ of Idaho 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. Date:. C ' d  !2 '9  1 0 5  
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 Time: 57 ? A /Y) 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 Deputy Clerk: 
Mailing Address: 
P. 0 .  Box 501 30 
Abbie M- 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-01 30 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-95 18 
Attorneys for Cary Sargent 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., 
an Idaho Limited Liability Company 
Plaintiff, 
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-02-00484 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM D. 
FALER 
William D. Faler, first being duly sworn, states as follows: 
1. I am the attorney of record on behalf of Cary Sargent in the above-entitled matter 
and I make the statements herein based upon my own personal knowledge unless 
otherwise stated. 
2. I was the attorney for Cary Sargent in obtaining a Judgment against Doyle Beck 
wherein Cary Sargent recovered an amount of $28,896.88 on February 7,2008, 
and for which attorney fees and costs were granted in the amount of $53,323.25 
on March 3 1,2008, making the total judgment due of $82,220.13. 
3. I am not related in any way to Cary Sargent. 
4. Neither I nor any member of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., have any 
right whatsoever to manage Cary Sargent's business (Gckin Koncrete) or any part 
of his personal life. 
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5 .  I have never been involved in business decisions or operations in any manner 
whatsoever involving Cary Sargant and/or Kickin Koncrete. 
6 .  The sole relationship between myself, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
on the one part, and Cary Sargent on the other, is that Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & 
Crapo, P.L.L.C and myself, were hired by Cary Sargent and ultimately directed by 
him to defend a lawsuit brought against him by High Valley Concrete, Inc., and to 
prosecute a claim against Doyle Beck on Cary Sargent's behalf. 
7. The agreement between Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. and Cary 
Sargent regarding payment for the incurred attorney fees and costs was that no 
payment was due in either the defense of the High Valley Concrete, Inc., lawsuit 
or the prosecution of the claim against Doyle Beck until after the conclusion of 
those matters. 
8. Two separate billings were prepared in January and March 2004, but neither was 
presented to Cary Sargent for payment until after the conclusion of the pending 
litigation in February 2008. Thus, there was no outstanding debt to Holden, 
Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. at the time of the Security Agreement. 
9. Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C. received a payment from Cary 
Sargent in April 2008, in response to the presentation of the billings for fees and 
costs. 
10. Payment arrangements are still pending as to how much will be expected to be 
paid monthly. 
Dated t h i s a ? a y  of April, 2008. 
State of Idaho 1 
:ss 
County of Bonneville ) 
4 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3 - day of April, 2008. 
Residing at: Z m F  7%' 
Commission Expires: 5?27. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or 
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the 
correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on this 7 9 % a y  of April, 2008. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: Affidavit of William D. Faler 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
William D. Ibkf . 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
Bryan D. Smith 
B.J. Driscoll 
McGrath, Meacham, Smith, P.L.L.C. 
4 1 4 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
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District Seven Court 
William D. Faler, Esq. county of Fremont 
Idaho State Bar No. 1464 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. Date: 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 Time: 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
mail in^ Address: Deputy Clerk: 
P. 0 .  Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-01 30 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-951 8 
Attorneys for Cary Sargent 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., 
an Idaho Limited Liability Company 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-02-00484 
AFFIDAVIT OF CARY SARGENT 
Cary Sargent, first being duly sworn, states as follows: 
1. I am a party in the above entitled-action and I make the statements herein based 
upon my own personal knowledge unless otherwise stated. 
2. I am the judgment creditor in an action against Doyle Beck wherein I recovered a 
Judgment in the amount of $28,896.88 on February 7,2008, and for which 
attorney fees and costs were granted in the amount of $53,323.25 on March 3 1, 
2008, making the total judgment due of $82,220.13. 
3. My business, Kickin Koncrete, is a sole proprietorship under which 1; as an 
individual, do business under the assumed business name of Kickin Koncrete. 
4. I have no employees in my business other than myself. 
Affidavit of Carey Sargent 
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I have no agent of any type that has any authority whatsoever to manage my 
business or my personal life. 
I am not related in any way to William D. Faler. 
Neither William D. Faler nor any member of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, 
P.L.L.C. has any right whatsoever to manage my business or any part of my 
personal life. 
William D. Faler has never been involved in my business in any manner 
whatsoever. 
The sole relationship between William D. Faler and Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & 
Crapo, P.L.L.C. on the one part, and myself on the other, is that Mr. Faler and 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. were hired by me and ultimately 
directed by me to defend a lawsuit brought against me by High Valley Concrete, 
Inc., and to prosecute a claim that I am the sole owner of, against Doyle Beck. 
In November 2007, I paid Glendale Construction the sum of $5,000.00 on my 
debt to Glendale Construction. 
In December 2007, I paid an additional amount (I believe to have been $3,000.00) 
on my debt to Glendale Construction. 
There is no timetable or required repayment date for my debt to Glendale 
Construction and my understanding is that there is no expectation or demand for 
immediate payment of that debt. I believe that payment status was confirmed by 
Gene Sluder in his testimony at the trial of this matter. 
In January 2008, I was current on my bills and had sufficient h d s  to pay the 
200 1 tax obligation. 
As to my obligation to Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. and William D. 
Faler, my arrangement was that no payment was due for attorney fees and costs in 
either the defense of the High Valley Concrete, Inc., lawsuit or the prosecution of 
my claim against Doyle Beck until after the conclusion of those matters. 
Although I understood two billings were prepared in January and March 2004, I 
did not receive copies of those billings in conformity with the above agreement 
and thus no payment was due from me at the time the security agreement was 
granted to Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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16. In January 2008, I was current on all of my bills, including the tax bill which I 
believe was paid. 
17. In any event, I started the month of January 2008, with $7,800.00 in my bank 
account and ended the month with $3,300.00 in the bank and all of my currently 
due bills paid. 
18. I had paid all of my business expenses and in fact had a credit with at least one 
creditor as of the end of January 2008. 
19. My house payment and utilities were also current. 
20. I started making payments to Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C. in April 
2008. 
Dated this 2T  day of April, 2008. 
State of Idaho 1 
County of 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this zCl%ay of April, 2008. 
h 
-=-A-A-s-6- Notary Public ibr Idaho ,- 
, , (~sWi)!. i ~ b ~  D. I-. fsL*T Residing at: ' 7 d ~ k  L &Yk ,, - 7-)$ . 
IVO-~+.RY P [ ) E ~  il:; I Commission Expires: -7- /? - 0 7 
STP,l-E QF !rj!+t.l<:i ( 
>* 
-=----r--"-~-+..- *w-C"--> .,?> ..r*w :" *,  , < , -:,?, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifL that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or 
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the 
correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on this 2 4" day of April, 2008. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: Affidavit of Cary Sargent 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
Bryan D. Smith 
B.J. Driscoll 
McGrath, Meacham, Smith, P.L.L.C. 
4 1 4 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
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DISTRICT SEVEN COURT 
JntY of Fremont State of Idaho 
b ..2d: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE c O L ~ ~ N I  
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Case No. CV-02-0484 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE 
The Court held a hearing yesterday on High Valley's motion contesting Mr. 
Sargent's exemption claim for his counsel's fees. Mr. Faler took a sizeable security 
interest in Mr. Sargent's property. An ethical issue was briefly raised, whether Sargent- 
Faler transaction created a conflict of interest. 
The Court gave Mr. Faler 14 days to submit further briefing, and it gave Mr. 
Smith 7 d q s  thereafter. Ificluded in thst briefing, the Cocrt \r;ould like the parties to 
address I.R.P.C. 1.8(a). The ethical issue may be irrelevant to the issue before the 
Court-whether to deny Mr. Sargent's exemption as an unlawful transfer. But the Court 
will allow the parties to argue I.R.P.C. 1.8(a)'s applicability in their briefs. 
Dated this - 
Notice 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment was 
served upon the following individuals via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this day 
of April, 2008, unless otherwise indicated: 
Bryan D. Smith 
B.J. Driscoll 
P.O. Box 50731 
414 Schoup Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
John Ohman 
P.O. Box 51600 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
William D. Faler 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Clerk of the Court 
By: 
Notice 
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William D. Faler, Esq. 
Idaho State Bar No. 1464 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HaHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Mailing Address: 
- 
, HICT SEVEN COURT 
Couniv of Fremont State of Idaho 
Filed: 
1 5 '1008 
By: 
Deputy Clerk 
P. 0 .  Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-95 18 
Attorneys for Cary Sargent 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., 
an Idaho Limited Liability Company 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-02-00484 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
OF WILLIAM D. FALER 
William D. Faler, first being duly sworn, states as follows: 
1. I am the attorney of record on behalf of Cary Sargent in the above-entitled matter 
and I make the statements herein based upon my own personal knowledge unless 
otherwise stated. 
2. Cary Sargent retained myself and the law firm Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, 
P.L.L.C. to provide him legal counsel and representation in a lawsuit filed by 
High Valley Concrete, LLC through Doyle Beck against himself plus representing 
Cary Sargent in a lawsuit against Doyle Beck for his "lost" interest in High Valley 
Concrete, LLC. 
3. On information and belief, Doyle Beck had "kicked" Cary Sargent out of High 
Valley Concrete, LLC, and thus Cary Sargent had no job, no income, no means of 
paying in advance for the necessary legal services. 
Supplemental Affidavit of William D. Faler 
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Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C. agreed to provide the legal services 
with payment for the attorney fees and costs to be made either from the proceeds 
of any verdict rendered in Cary Sargent's favor or fiom other assets. 
In the beginning, the action filed by High Valley Concrete, ELC was very 
insignificant and it was my belief that Cary had a much larger claim against High 
Valley Concrete, LLC which would be filed as a counterclaim against High Valley 
Concrete, LLC. 
Subsequently it was determined that Cary's claim was against Doyle Beck 
personally instead of High Valley Concrete, LLC. 
In August 2006, High Valley Concrete, LLC filed a Motion to Amend Complaint, 
the proposed Amended Complaint increased High Valley Concrete's claim against 
Cary Sargent significantly. 
At that point, the legal services required by myself and Holden, Kidwell, Hahn 
and Crapo, P.L.L.C. were changed from mainly prosecuting a counterclaim to 
both prosecuting a plaintiffs claim and defending a significant claim against him. 
Although legal services were being provided to Cary Sargent by myself and the 
law firm of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.E.L.C., there was no obligation 
for Cary to actually pay for any of those services until after the trial in the matter 
was completed. 
Cary Sargent was not, and is not now, in default on any obligation to pay Holden, 
Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C. and to the best of my knowledge is not 
insolvent as a result of legal fees. 
Only a portion of the legal fees secured by the Security Agreement were 
antecedent to the date of that agreement. 
Legal services provided to Cary Sargent during January and February of 2008 for 
the prosecution of the claim against Doyle Beck and the defense of the High 
Valley Concrete, LLC's claims was $56,000.00. 
I am still the attorney of record in the matter and have continued to provide legal 
counsel to Cary Sargent since the completion of the trial in early February 2008. 
Since February 2008, additional fees have been incurred in the amount of 
$12,004.00 for post-judgment motions and hearings. 
Supplemental Affidavit of William D. Faler 
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15. With the filing of the Notices of Appeal by High Valley Concrete and Cary 
Sargent, it is my belief that additional fees will be incurred between $30,000.00 
and $50,000.00. 
16. The fees incurred during the trial, for post-trial motions, the fees to be incurred in 
the future during the appeal process are not antecedent to the Security Agreement. 
Dated this /$%ay of May, 2008. 
State of Idaho ) 
: SS 
County of Bonneville ) 
i-r\ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this )IJ; day of May, 2008. 
Residing at: f l L w  z/] 
Commission Expires: 9 2 7 . ~ 7  
Supplemental Affidavit of William D. Faler 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that 1 am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or 
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the 
correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on this fc/Lday of May, 2008. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: Supplemental Affidavit of William D. Faler 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
cGrath, Meacham, Smith, P.E.E.C. 
14 Shoup Avenue 
Cox Ohman & Brandstetter 
William D Faler 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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f, - 
a 
William D. Faler, Esq. " P Y  1 5 2008 
~daho State Bar No. 1464 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN CRAPO, P.L-L.C- 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
- Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Mailing Address: 
P. 0. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-95 18 
Attorneys for Cary Sargent 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., 
an Idaho Limited Liability Company 
PlaintiffIResgondent, 
VS. 
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant/Appellant . 
Case No. CV-02-00484 
SARGENT'S MEMORANDUM 
REGARDING SECURITY 
AGREEMENT 
COMES NOW, Cary Sargent, by and through his attorney of record William D. Faler, of 
the law firm Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and hereby submits this Memorandum 
Regarding the Security Agreement filed in the above-matter. 
I. 
RULE 1.8 I.R.P.C. IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE PENDING MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE THE SECURITY AGREEMENT 
It is Cary Sargent's (hereafter "Sargent") and Hoiden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, 
P.L.L.C.'s (hereafter "Holden Kidwell) position that Rule 1.8(a) of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct does not ~rohibit the security interest that Sargent gave to Holden Kidwell 
Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement 
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on his cause of action against Doyle Beck (hereafter "Beck") and any verdict rendered on such 
course of action. Rule 1.8(a)'s key term is "adverse" to the client. Because the security interest 
provided by Sargent to Holden Kidwell was not adverse to the client's interest, there was no 
violation of IRPC 1 &a). 
Sargent's primary interest was in having legal counsel continue to represent him in the 
matters that ultimately went to trial in late January, 2008. Two specific matters were involved. 
One was the prosecution of a plaintiffs claim against Doyle Beck. The second was the defense 
of a claim brought by High Valley Concrete, Inc (hereafter High Valley Concrete"). 
Several months prior to the commencement of the trial, Sargent and Holden Kidwell 
commenced discussions about how Holden Kidwell would be paid for the legal representation 
that had been provided to that point in time in prosecuting the one claim and defending the other; 
and the work that still needed to be done to prepare for trial, prosecute a id  defend the two 
matters at trial and collect any judgment that might be obtained. Sargent was very specific in his 
directions to Holden Kidwell in that he wanted to make sure that Holden Kidwell would be paid 
for the legal services that had already been provided and those which were to be provided in 
November and December of 2007, and January and February of 2008, and in the future as it was 
almost certain there would be an appeal of the trial verdicts. 
Sargent and Holden Kidwell had agreed at the start of the attorney-client relationship that 
Sargent would not be expected to pay for the legal services until after verdicts were received. 
Two billings were prepared by Holden Kidwell very early in the case but again payment was not 
expected until a verdict was received. After the first two billings, it was decided not to continue 
the practice of preparing billings because of problems it caused in the time and cost billing 
;argent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement 
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software. Both matters were being handled on an hourly basis. Part of these discussions 
centered on reactions Beck might have to an adverse verdict against him and actions that he 
might cause High Valley Concrete to take if any adverse verdict was directed to Sargent. The 
primary interest of Sargent was that legal services continue to be provided to him in both 
matters. As such, Sargent had a valid reason for providing the security interest to Holden 
Kidwell and the providing of the same was not adverse to his interests. 
There was never any intent for Holden Kidwell to be adverse to Sargent. The security 
interest which was received does not operate in a way adverse to Sargentys interests. Rather, the 
security interest was helpfbl to Sargent in that it allowed him to continue to receive legal services 
from Holden Kidwell through the months leading up to trial, during the trial itself, and for post- 
trial matters. At the same time, it gave some protection to Holden Kidwell in continuing to 
provide legal services leading up to the trial and through the uial and through post-trial motions. 
The second reason that IRBC 1.8(a) is not applicable is that IRPC 1.8(a) is for the 
protection of the client - in this case Sargent. The present motion before the Court is High Valley 
Concrete's, not Sargent's. There is no protection for High Valley Concrete arising from IRPC 
1.8(a) or its application. Rule 1.8(a) is simply not applicable to the present matter before the 
Court. High Valley Concrete has no standing to claim any benefit or application from the rule in 
the relationship between Sargent and Holden Kidwell. 
PI. 
ADEOUATE CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN FOR SECURITY INTEREST 
High Valley Concrete and Beck claim that the security agreement and lien arising from 
that security agreement is an unlawful transfer that should be voided by the Court. Idaho Code 
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Section 55-91 2 defines value as it relates to unlawful transfers. Sub-part (1) provides that value 
is given if an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied. 
Sargent retained Holden Kidwell shortly after Beck kicked Sargent out of High Valley 
Concrete. After being "kicked out", Sargent had no job, no income and, thus, no means of 
paying in advance for the necessary legal services to fight Beck. Holden Kidwell agreed to 
provide legal services with payment to be made either from the proceeds of any verdict rendered 
in Sargent's favor or his own income/assets. The action against Sargent was very insignificant at 
the time the fee arrangement was agreed upon, and the thinking was that Sargent's claim would 
be the far larger claim. At the time it was also believed that thinking Sargent's claim would be 
against High Valley Concrete. Thus the defense of High Valley Concrete's claims would be 
minimal and the effort for the prosecution of the counterclaim far greater. 
Subsequently it was determined that Sargent's claim would be against Beck personally. It 
was not until October 2006 that High Valley Concrete claims against Sargent were increased 
greatly. The legal services changed from mostly being provided for a plaintiffs claim to being 
provided for both a plaintiffs claim and the defense of a highly inflated and fabricated claim 
against Sargent. 
As to those legal services provided prior to the security agreement the securing of the 
debt for those services, provided value as defined by Idaho Code Section 55-912. 
111. 
SARGENT WAS NOT INSOLVENT 
It should be noted that High Valley Concrete's claim as originally filed in 2002 was for 
the return of a cell phone, the use of post office box and access to a bank account. Those were 
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the claims that existed in High Valley Concrete's matter against Cary Sargent until late August 
of 2006, when High Valley Concrete filed a motion to amended its claim. High Valley Concrete 
now argues that its claims against Sargent of $600,000.00 plus existed from at least February 
2002. Those claims were alleged to have roots in the relationship between Beck and Sargent in 
High Valley Concrete which operated from 1997 through February 2002, but even High Valley 
Concrete would be hard pressed to say that they knew they had a $600,000.00 claim against Cary 
Sargent in February 2002. If they did, why was there not an amended claim until October of 
2006, four and a half years later. The fact is that while the dispute arose out of that relationship, 
the jury certainly did not find that anything near $600,000.00 of claims were valid. Rather only 
approximately only 8% of High Valley Concrete's claims were accepted by the jury. High 
Valley Concrete, however, wants the Court to accept the $600,000.00 of claims that the jury 
found were not valid and not justified as a basis for finding the insolvency of Cary Sargent. 
The truth is that Beck kicked Sargent out of High Valley Concrete and took almost all of 
Sargent's assets in February 2002. It would be blatantly unfair to hold that Sargent was insolvent 
because of a claimed debt to High Valley Concrete when the lack of assets and a job were created 
by High Valley Concrete. At the time the security agreement was taken, Sargent and Holden 
Kidwell believed that the claims against Sargent by High Valley Concrete were not valid but 
instead ridiculous. The jury agreed with us in that assessment and found that 92% of the claimed 
debt was not valid. 
A. Cary Sargent was not I[nsolvent as a Result of any Glendale Construction, Inc. Debt. 
High Valley Concrete claims Sargent was insolvent because he owed Glendale 
Construction md had not paid the debt. High Valley Concrete conveniently overlooks the 
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testimony of Gene Sluder in the trial of this matter wherein he testified that the company of 
which he was president, Glendale Construction, Inc., did not expect Sargent to pay any debt to 
Glendale until Sargent was financially able to make such payments and that the payment 
schedule was up to Sargent. Thus there was not a due date for the Glendale obligations. If High 
Valley Concrete's position is accepted by the Court, then anyone who has purchased a piece of 
property on a promissory note, mortgage, etc. would likely be insolvent because the entire 
amount of the note would be due as of day one. That simply was not case, and is not the case 
regarding any debt owed by Sargent to Glendale. Sargent was in fact paying Glendale according 
to the terms of their agreement. See the Affidavit of Cary Sargent filed on April 29,2008. 
B. Cary Sargent was not Insolvent because of any Holden Kidwell Legal Fees/Costs 
Obligation. 
Sargent needed legal representation as a result of Beck's antics and claims under the guise 
of High Valley Concrete. He arranged for that legal representation in the only way he could, and 
that was with the expectation that he would be able to pay for such fees and costs after the matter 
was finally tried and a verdict was rendered in his favor. Although legal services were being 
provided to Sargent by Holden Kidwell, there was no obligation to actually gay for those services 
until the trial was completed, Therefore, Sargent was not in default on any obligation to pay 
Holden Kidwell and was not insolvent as a result of the legal fees. Given that understanding, the 
obligations to Wolden Kidwell were not due at the time the security interest was provided and 
Sargent should not be found to be insolvent because of an obligation that was not yet due. 
High Valley Concrete has not shown that Sargent did not have sufficient assets to pay his 
debts. In order to avail itself of the insolvency argument, it must prove that Sargent is in fact 
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insolvent. It has not done so. 
IV. 
HOLDEN KIDWELL IS NOT AN INSIDER 
Idaho Code Section 55-91 4(2) provides that a transfer is fraudulent only if each of the 
following conditions exist: 
1. The claim of the creditor arose before the transfer was made; 
2. The transfer was made to an insider; 
3. 'Fhe transfer was for an antecedent debt; 
4. The debtor was insolvent; and 
5 .  The insider had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent. 
If any one or more of the five items does not exist, there is no fraudulent transfer under 
Idaho Code Section 55-9 14(2). 
High Valley Concrete argues that Holden Kidwell was an "insider" to Sargent under the 
UnlawfUl Transfers Act at the time the security interest was created. High Valley Concrete 
contends that Holden Kidwell, or one or more of its attorneys, somehow was a managing agent of 
Sargent and an "insider" on that basis. The term "managing agent" is defined by Ballentine's 
Law Dictionary as, "a person to whom a corporation has given general powers involving the 
exercise of judgment and discretion in conducting the corporation's business." 
The fact is that none of the attorneys of Holden Kidwell have ever had any right or ability 
or have in fact ever sought to manage or direct any of Sargent's activities in operating his 
concrete business or m i n g  his life. Rather, the only involvement of Holden Kidwell, or any of 
its attorneys, was in providing legal services to Sargent as an independent contractor. If the 
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flawed logic of Beck and High Valley Concrete is followed, any attorney who ever provided 
legal services to any client would therefore be a managing agent of that client and thereby subject 
to potential liability. Such a result is simply not logical, feasible or fair, and we believe it is not 
what was intended under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. It would surprise us greatly, if 
High Valley Concrete's counsel honestly believes he is the managing agent of Beck or any of 
Beck's companies, or even of High Valley Concrete itself just because he provides legal 
representation to Beck or a Beck company. If so, he practices a much different scope of law than 
does Holden Kidwell. In our firm, the ultimate direction that a client's case takes is the decision 
of the client. We advise the client of his rights, the law, his options, what he can or cannot do, 
who he should call as witnesses, etc., but the ultimate decision as to the course of the case is 
made by the client. An example would be an appeal. We advise the client and the client, not 
Holden Kidwell, decides whether to appeal or not. As such, we are at the most inferior agents - 
not managing agents. 
High Valley Concrete has not cited a case where an attorney representing a client in a 
litigation is held to be a managing agent of the client or an insider of a client. Research done on 
behalf of Sargent has not located a case holding an attorney to be an insider simply because he 
provides legal services for litigation. 
v. 
NOT ALE OF THE LEGAL SERVICES WERE ANTECEDENT 
TO THE SECURITY INTEREST 
Only part of the legal services provided by HoIden Kidwell to Sargent were provided 
before the security interest was provided by Sargent to Holden Kidwell, During January and 
February of 2008, the legal services provided to Sargent on the High Valley Concrete claim were 
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$28,499.00 and the legal services provided for the prosecution of the claim against Beck 
resulting in the judgment against Beck for the same time period, January and February 2008, 
were $27,501 "00 for a total of the two claims for that time period of $56,000.00. Since February 
2008, Holden Kidwell has provided legal services to Sargent in the amount of $12,004.00. It is 
also expected that with appeals and motions, such as the present motion, Sargent will incur 
additional fees of $20,000.00 to $30,000.00. If a new trial is needed, additional fees in the range 
of another $30,000.00 to $50,000.00 will be incurred. Certainly the legal fees for those services 
are not antecedent debts. 
Thus, attorney fees already incurred of at least $66,000.00 were not antecedent. The 
security agreement is at the very least valid as to that amount plus whatever additional fees and 
costs are incurred in the future. Because at least $66,000.00 of the legal services and costs are 
not antecedent, High Valley Concrete's motion must be denied. 
we 
THE CREATION OF THE SECURITY INTEREST WAS NOT A FRAUDULENT 
TRANSFER UNDER IDAHO CODE SECTION 55-913 
Idaho Code Section 55-913 provides that, "a transfer made, or obligation incurred by a 
debtor is a fraudulent as to a creditor .... if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation; 
a) with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud .... or b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange for the transfer ..." The security interest granted to Holden Kidwell was 
provided by Sargent in return for receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the 
transfer (security agreement). There is no evidence before the Court that the services provided by 
Holden Kidwell and the services to be provided by Holden Kidwell were unreasonable. That fact 
alone takes the security interest given by Sargent to Holden Kidwell out of the operation of Idaho 
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Code Section 55-913. No one has argued (or could reasonably or truthfully argue) that Sargent 
did not receive legal services and the legal services were not both reasonable and for the most 
part successful in lessening the liability of Sargent (by 92%) and in recovering a verdict against 
Beck. Given that fact, the security interest granted to Holden Kidwell cannot be voided pursuant 
to Idaho Code Section 55-913 regardless of whether the Court addresses the alleged "insider" 
argument, or the "intent to hinder" argument, or the "insolvency" argument presented by High 
Valley Concrete. 
VII* 
THE CREATION OF THE SECURITY INTEREST WAS NOT A FRAUDULENT 
TRANSFER UNDER IDAHO CODE SECTION 55-914!a) 
In order for a transfer to be fi-audulent under the terms of Idaho Code Section 55-914(a) 
the transfer would have to be made without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange 
for the transfer regardless of insolvency. The creation of the security agreement was for legal 
services provided and constitutes a reasonably equivalent value. No showing of 
unreasonableness, or not receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the security 
agreement has been made by High Valley Concrete. 
WII. 
HQEDEN KIDWELL HAS A CHARGING LIEN PURSUANT TO IDAHO LAW 
Idaho Code Section 3-205 provides that an attorney who appears for a party in an action 
has a lien on the client's cause of action which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment 
in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever's hands they may come. From the 
commencement of arm action or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney 
who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim which 
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attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in 
whosoever's hands they may come. The effect of Idaho Code Section 3-205 is to create an 
attorney's charging lien. See Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,660 P.2d 928 (1983). 
A charging lien is not dependant upon possession. A charging lien is equitable in nature, 
and such equitable nature requires that the attorney take affirmative steps in an adjudicative 
process to reduce his lien to a judgment or order of the Court. See Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 
463,660 P.2d 928 (1983). Holden Kidwell is in the process of doing just that. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 3-205, the commencement of an action or service of a 
cobnterclaim creates the attorney's charging lien on the verdict rendered, judgment entered or 
settlement proceeds obtained. See White v. St. Alphonsus, 01.17 ICAR 722. The White Court 
noted that Idaho Code Section 3-205 provides in part, "... fiom the commencement of an action, 
or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a 
lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision 
or judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come ..." 
Regardless of the validity of the written Security Interest that High Valley Concrete seeks 
to void, Holden Kidwell has a lien on the proceeds of the judgment rendered against Beck. 
CONCLUSION 
Sargent and his attorneys, Holden KidwelI, respectfully request that the Court deny High 
Valley Concrete's Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption 
Pbs the following reasons: 
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1. Holden Kidwell provided adequate consideration to Sargent for the security 
interest by providing legal services both before and after the date of the Security 
Agreement. 
2. Sargent was not insolvent at the time he provided the Security Agreement to 
Holden Kidwell. 
3. Holden Kidwell was not the managing agent of Sargent and thus is not an insider 
as required by Idaho Code Section 55-9 14(2). 
4. Only part of the debt for the legal services was antecedent to the providing of the 
Security Agreement, and the part that is not antecedent plus the amounts that will 
almost certainly be incurred in the pending appeals, more than exceeds the 
judgment in the Sargent v. Beck matter. 
5. IFh Security Agreement was not a fraudulent transfer under Idaho Code Section 
55-9 13 because Sargent received a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for 
the Security Agreement. 
6 .  The Security Agreement was not a fraudulent transfer under Idaho Code Section 
55-914(1) as reasonable value was given by Holden Kidwell for the Security 
Agreement by continuing to provide legal services to Sargent and by providing 
legal services that were antecedent. 
7. Holden Kidwell has a charging lien on Sargent's verdict, judgment and the 
proceeds thereof that is not defeated by a Judgment Creditor attempting to attach 
the verdict or judgment. 
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Sargent and Holden Kidwell further believe that IRPC 1.8(a) has no application to the 
present motion before the Court. 
Dated this /4/Qay of May, 2008. 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or 
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the 
correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on this / q d a y  of May, 2008. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
McGrath, Meacham, Smith, P.E.E.C. 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
Cox Ohman & Brandstetter 
William D. Faler 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.E.E.C. 
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Telephone: (208) 524-073 1 
Telefax: (208) 529-4 166 
Bryan D, Smith, Esq. - ISB NO. 441 1 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB NO. 7010 
McGRATH, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. 0 .  Box 50731 
4 1 4 Shoup Avenue 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, High Valley Concrete, L.L.C. 
RlCT SEVEN CO[)RT CL Y of Fremont State of Idaho 
F~led: 
! !,Y 2 3 2008 
By: 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 - 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Case No. CV-02-0484 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO CONTEST CLAIM OF 
EXEMPTION AND THIRD-PARTY 
CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
Defendants. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
Pursuant to this court's notice dated ApriI 30,2008 ("Notice"), the plaintiff, High 
Valley Concrete, L.L.C. ("High Valley") files this brief in support of its motion to contest 
the claims of exemption filed by the judgment-debtor, Cary Sargent ("Sargent"), and 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC ("Faler's Firm"), the law firm of Sargent's 
lawyer, William D. Faler. For the reasons set forth more fully below, the court should 
grant High Valley's motion and deny Sargent's claim of exemption and Faler7s Firm's 
third-party claim of exemption. 
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11. SARGENT GAVE THE SECURITY INTEREST TO FALER'S FIRM THREE 
DAYS AFTER COMMENCEMENT OF THE TRIAL. 
The security agreement Faler's Firm relies on in its claim of exemption is dated 
Saturday, January 26,2008. Trial in this matter began on Wednesday, January 23,2008. 
Thus, Sargent and Faler's Firm executed the security agreement three days after trial began, 
not before trial as High Valley previously mentioned.' Thus, three days into trial, Faler was 
concerned that High Valley could get a large judgment against Sargent and then execute on 
all of Sargent7s assets. If that happened, Faler's Firm would not get paid. So to ensure its 
own payment, Faler's Firm acted on its inside information and took a security interest in all 
of Sargent7s assets. 
111. FALER'S FIRM'S SECURITY INTEREST IN SARGENT7S ASSETS IS 
PROHIBITED BECAUSE FALER HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH IDAHO 
RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.8(a). 
In its Notice, the court specifically requested the parties address Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct I .8(a), which provides as follows: 
Rule 1.8: Conflict Of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules 
(a) A lawyer shaII not enter into a business transaction with a client or 
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other 
pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless: 
( 1 )  the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the 
interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully 
disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be 
reasonably understood by the client; 
(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of 
seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the 
advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction; and 
1 See p. 3 of High Valley's Brief In Support Of Motion To Contest Claim Of Exemption And Third-Party 
Claim Of Exemption, already on file with the court. Sargent's security agreement is dated 3 days after trial 
began, not 27 days before trial began. 
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(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by 
the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the 
lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the 
lawyer is representing the client in the transaction. 
Rule I .8(a) does not merely discourage a lawyer from obtaining a security interest 
adverse to the client, but prohibits it. This prohibition is in effect unless and until the lawyer 
complies with the requirements of Rule 1.8(a). 
Here, it is undisputed that Faler's Firm acquired a security interest in what appears to 
be all of Sargent's present and fiture assets. Faler's Firm has presented no evidence that it 
advised Sargent "in writing of the desirability of seeking . . . the advice of independent legal 
counsel" or that it gave Sargent "a reasonable opportunity to seek" such counsel. I.R.P.C. 
1.8(a). Faler's Firm has presented no evidence that Sargent gave "informed consent, in a 
writing signed by [Sargent] to the essential terms of the [security interest] and the lawyer's 
role in the transaction." Id. In short, Faler's Firm engaged in a prohibited business 
transaction with its client to the prejudice of creditor's like High Valley. 
Instead of complying with Rule 1 $(a), Faler's Firm tries to avoid application of the 
rule by arguing that the rule does not apply because Faler's Firm's interest is not "adverse" 
to Sargent. Apparently, just as Faler could not see the conflict in representing both Sargent 
and co-defendant Glendale Construction, Inc. ("Glendale"), Faler cannot see the conflict in 
representing Sargent while taking a security interest in all of Sargent's property. By Faler's 
Firm's own admission, Sargent is in debt to the firm for nearly $200,000. While Sargent has 
a possessory interest in his property, Faler's Firm claims a security interest in that same 
property. The conflict between Faler's Firm collecting this sizeable debt and Sargent 
keeping his property is obvious. Faler's Firm's claim that "[tlhere was never any intent for 
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[Faler's Firm] to be adverse to sargentV2 is irrelevant. Rule I .8(a) does not provide an 
exception for the lawyer that has no "intent'' to act adversely to his client. 
Moreover, Rule 1.8(a) is specifically designed to address the very conflict between 
Faler's Firm and Sargent at issue in this motion to contest the claim of exemption. 
Paragraph 9 of the Preamble to the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct explains, "Virtually 
all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to 
clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an ethical 
person while earning a satisfactory living." This is exactly the "conflict" Faler's Firm 
has right now. Faler owes a fiduciary duty to place his client's interests ahead of his 
own. However, Faler also has an interest in "earning a satisfactory living." When such 
conflicts arise, Rule 1.8(a) sets forth mandatory safeguards to protect the conflicting 
interests of the lawyer and the client. Faler's Firm has not complied with these 
mandatory safeguards. As such Faler's Firm's security interest in its client's property is a 
prohibited transaction. 
Faler's Firm makes one final argument that High Valley has no standing to claim 
any protection from Rule 1.8(a) because the transaction is between only Faler's Firm and 
Sargent. However, a lawyer's duty often extends beyond the duty to his client. For 
example, lawyers owe certain minimum duties to non-client heirs to prepare testamentary 
documents in a competent manner. See, e.g., Harrig$eld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136 
(2004). Lawyers also owe an independent duty to the integrity of the legal system, a duty 
that would necessarily include compliance with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Not only does High Valley have standing to challenge the legality of Faler's Firm's 
2 See p. 3 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court. 
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security interest, but this court has the right and the obligation to review the propriety of 
such an agreement and to set it aside because Faler's Firm has not complied with the 
mandatory prerequisites for obtaining a valid security interest in Sargent's property. 
Faler's Firm realized three days into trial that High Valley could get a large 
judgment against Sargent. High Valley could then execute on all of Sargent's assets and 
Faler's Firm would not get paid. To ensure his own ability to "earn[] a satisfactory living," 
Faler acted on his inside information and took a security interest in all of Sargent's assets in 
violation of Rule 1.8(a). 
IV. FALER'S FIRM HAS NO ATTORNEY'S CHARGING LIEN IN SARGENT'S 
JUDGMENT. 
Faler's Firm has no attorney's charging lien against Sargent's judgment under Idaho 
Code Section 3-205 for two reasons. First, Faler's Firm has waived its right to any lien 
under Section 3-205. Idaho Code Section 1 1-203 states, "A third party claimant shall 
prepare a written claim setting forth the grounds upon which he claims the property . . ." 
(Emphasis added.) Then, the "third party claim shall be delivered or mailed to the sheriff 
within fourteen (14) days" after the sheriff serves the claim of exemption. I.C. 5 1 1 -203(a). 
Here, Faler's Firm failed to timely "set[] forth the grounds upon which [it] claims 
the property." In its third party claim, Faler's Firm did not make any reference to an 
attorney's lien or to Idaho Code Section 3-205. Faler's Firm failed to assert Section 3-205 
before the expiration of the 14-day period to file its third party claim of exemption. In fact, 
Faler's Firm did not assert Section 3-205 in response to High Valley's motion to contest the 
third party claim of exemption at any time before or at the hearing. Faler's Firm may have 
had multiple grounds for claiming Sargent's judgment was exempt from execution, but the 
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only grounds it asserted was the security agreement. Faler's Firm waived any lien it had 
under Section 3-205. 
Moreover, even had Faler's Firm not waived the Section 3-205 attorney's charging 
lien, Faler's Firm did not taken the necessary steps to perfect the lien. The Idaho Supreme 
Court stated, "The equitable source of the claimed charging lien necessitates that an attorney 
take affirmative steps in an adjudicative process to perfect and reduce his lien to a 
judgment or order of the court." Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,466 (1 983) (emphasis 
added). Faler's Firm has not taken any affirmative steps in an adjudicative process to 
"perfect" its attorney's lien by reducing it "to a judgment or order of the court." Id. Faler's 
Firm's lien has not been reviewed and adjudicated by any court. Faler's Firm is now too 
late to attempt to perfect its attorney's lien because High Valley has already executed on the 
very judgment in which Faler's Firm now asserts the lien. For a lienholder to enjoy the h l l  
benefits of a lien, the lienholder must have perfected the lien and not merely be "in the 
process" of perfecting the lien. Just as in Frazee, Faler's Firm has failed to perfect its 
potential attorney's charging lien under Section 3-205. 
V. FALER'S FIRM SOUGHT THE "PROTECTION" OF THE SECURITY 
INTEREST BECAUSE IT HAD REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE 
SARGENT WAS INSOLVENT AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSFER. 
The issue under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA") is whether Faler's 
Firm had reasonable cause to believe that Sargent was insolvent. I.C. 5 55-914(2). 
Faler's Firm's own admission that the security interest gave it "some protection . . . 
in continuing to provide legal servicesv3 highlights the fact that Faler's Firm knew Sargent 
was insolvent at the time the parties created the security interest. Faler's Firm needed no 
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protection if Sargent was solvent. Faler's Firm probably doesn't require all of its clients 
(such as the City of Idaho Falls or Ball Ventures, LLC) to sign agreements granting a 
security interest in all of the clients' assets before proceeding with representation. However, 
in this case Faler's Firm knew something about Sargent's financial condition that caused 
Faler's Firm to seek "some protection." Perhaps Faler's Firm noted that as of January 26, 
2008, Sargent owed Faler's Firm approximately $1 16,814.59 and had not made any 
payments in the 6 previous years the case was pending.4 Perhaps Faler's Firm realized 
Sargent had not paid Glendale on the $41'8 16.77 debt he owed to Glendale since ApriI 
2004.~ Perhaps Faler's Firm noted that Sargent has not been paying his income taxes as 
they came due, having paid his 200 1 federal taxes on or about December 12,2007.~ At any 
rate, three days into trial Faler's Firm knew Sargent was insolvent and determined that it 
needed "someprotection" that Sargent would pay his bill. The security interest in all of 
Sargent's assets executed three days into trial was Faler's Firm's response to Sargent's 
insolvency. 
VI. SARGENT IS PRESUMED INSOLVENT AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSFER 
TO FALER'S FIRM AND FALER'S FIRM HAS SUBMITTED NO EVIDENCE 
TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT SARGENT WAS INSOLVENT. 
Idaho's UFTA provides that "[a] debtor who is generally not paying his . . . debts as 
they become due is presumed to be insolvent." I.C. 5 55-9 1 1 (2). High Valley has already 
-- - 
3 See p. 3 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court. 
(Emphasis added.) 
See Exhibits "A" and "B" to the Motion, Memorandum of Fees and Costs and Affidavit for Attorney Fees 
and Costs on Behalf of Cary Sargent in Both the Matter of Sargent v. Beck and in the Matter of High 
Valley Concrete, LLC v. Sargent, already on file with the court. 
See High Valley Trial Exhibit #28 and the trial testimony of Cary Sargent and Kim Allen. 
See Cary Sargent's 2001 federal income tax return attached as Exhibit " B  to the Affidavit of Bryan D. 
Smith dated April 18, 2008, already on file with the court. 
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provided numerous examples that Sargent was "generally not paying his debts" as they 
became due at the time he transferred the security interest to Faler's ~irrn.' 
Instead of providing evidence that Sargent was solvent and was generally paying his 
debts as they became due, Faler's Firm attempts to explain away the repeated examples of 
Sargent's failure to pay his debts. As for Sargent's failure to timely pay his debt to Faler's 
Firm, Faler's Firm argues that they had not yet "become due" because "there was no 
obligation to actually pay for those [legal] services until the trial was completed."* 
Assuming this is correct, the court should note that three weeks after trial, Sargent still had 
not made any payment on his bi1L9 Faler's Firm has submitted no evidence that Sargent has 
paid anything since the concIusion of trial. Faler's Firm also gives the excuse that it did not 
regularly bill Sargent "because of problems . . . in the time and cost billing sof t~are ." '~  
Faler's Firm had sent out at least two bills to Sargent, one in January 2004 for $1 3,278.27, 
and one in March 2004 for $13'443.27." Both bills state on the first page, "Interest will be 
charged at the rate of 1 % per month (1 2% per annum) on outstanding accounts over 30 
days. Please make checks payable to Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo and include file # on 
checks."12 Based on Faler's Firm's o w  bilis, Sargent has not even paid the interest due on 
7 See p. 10-1 I of High Valley's Brief In Support Of Motion To Contest Claim Of Exemption And Third- 
Party Claim Of Exemption, already on file with the court. See also Section V, supra. 
8 See p. 6 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court. 
9 See Motion, Memorandum of Fees and Costs and Affidavit for Attorney Fees and Costs on Behalf of 
Cary Sargent in Both the Matter of Sargent v. Beck and in the Matter of High Valley Concrete, LLC v. 
Sargent, already on file with the court. 
lo See p. 2 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court. 
11 See Exhibit " B  to the Motion, Memorandum of Fees and Costs and Affidavit for Attorney Fees and 
Costs on Behalf of Cary Sargent in Both the Matter of Sargent v. Beck and in the Matter of High Valley 
Concrete, LLC v. Sargent, already on file with the rourt. 
l2 See Exhibit " B  to the Motion, Memoranduin of Fees and Costs and Affidavit for Attorney Fees and 
Costs on Behalf of Cary Sargent in Both the Matter of Sargent v. Beck and in the Matter of High Valley 
Concrete, LLC v. Sargent, already on file with the court. 
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his account. Faler's Firm's explanations fcr Sargent's failure to pay anything on his bill for 
six years are sham excuses for Sargent's insolvency. 
Faler's Firm gives the same excuse for Sargent's failure to pay anything on his 
$41,816.77 debt to Glendale as his failure to pay the debt to Faler's Firm, namely that 
payment had not yet "become due" because Gene Sluder testified that he did not expect 
Sargent to pay. However, Faler's Firm admits that Mr. Sluder did not expect Sargent to pay 
"until Sargent wasjinancially able."13 In other words, by Mr. Sluder's own testimony, 
Sargent did not pay his bill to Glendale because he was not "financially able," i.e., because 
Sargent was insolvent. Faler's Firm claims that Sargent has since made some payments to 
Glendale. However, the issue is not whether Sargent is insolvent now, but whether he was 
insolvent at the time of the transfer. I.C. 5 55-914(2). Whether Sargent has started paying 
his bills since January 26,2008, is irrelevant. 
High Valley has submitted evidence that Sargent was not generally paying his debts 
as they became due. Faler's Firm has tried to explain away this evidence, but has not 
submitted any evidence of its own proving Sargent's solvency. In fact, in attempting to 
rebut the presumption of insolvency, Faler's Firm has actually confirmed Sargent's 
insolvency. 
VII. FALER'S FIRM IS AN INSIDER BECAUSE FALER'S FIRM RELIED ON ITS 
CLOSE, FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP WITH SARGENT TO GAIN AN 
ADVANTAGE OVER OTHER CREDITORS. 
Transfers to insiders may be set aside under Idaho's UFTA. I.C. 5 55-914(a). In 
this case, Faler's Firm is an insider in relation to Sargent's transfer of a security interest in 
all Sargent's assets to Faler's Firm. The "insider" inquiry focuses on whether the 
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transferee's relationship with the debtor is sufficiently close to make the transfer subject to 
closer scrutiny. See In re Sky Valley, Inc., 135 B.R. 925,934 (N.D.Ga. 1992). This 
"insider" analysis "must be flexibly applied 'to include a broad range of parties who have a 
close relationship with the Debtor." In re Main, blc., 2 1 3 B.R. 67, 8 1 (E.D.Pa. 1 997). The 
statutory examples of an "insider" are "merely illustrative" and the definition "must be 
flexibly applied on a case-by-case basis." Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 175 B.R. 
438,499 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). At the center of the inquiry is "whether the [alleged insider] has 
used an opportunity to adjust its position in such a way that other creditors are 
prejudiced." In re Beverages Int '1, Ltd. '50 B.R. 273'28 1 (Mass. 198.5). 
Faler's Firm had a close, fiduciary relationship with Sargent. Faler's Firm used its 
position and superior information to obtain a security interest in all of Sargent's assets to the 
prejudice of all Sargent's creditors. The security agreement provided a win-win scenario for 
Faler's Firm and Sargent. Faler's Firm knew Sargent was insolvent, which is why it 
required the security agreement. The security agreement purports to ensure payment to 
Faler's Firm. Sargent benefited by rendering himselfjudgment proof. The only losers in 
the deal are Sargent's arms-length, non-insider creditors. 
Faler's Firm offers no explanation why the court should not apply greater scrutiny to 
Faler's Firm's security interest from Sargent. The UFTA requires a liberal construction 
primarily for the benefit of creditors. not grantees, for the "purpose of giving speedy relief 
against a fraudulent debtor."14 (Keep in mind that the jury already found Sargent liable for 
fraud in this very case.) Instead, Faler's Firm tries to distances itself from Sargent by 
13 See p. 6 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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offering and arguing the corporate definition of the term "managing agent," one of the 
examples listed in the UFTA's definition of "insider." However, not only is the list of 
"insiders" "merely illustrative," but Faler's Firm is Sargent's managing agent in this case. 
Faler's Firm is not Sargent's managing agent in Sargent's concrete business or personal life, 
but Faler's Firm cannot deny that it has both the power and the duty to act in Sargent's 
behalf in relation to this case. Faler's Fim is not Sargent's managing agent for all purposes, 
but it is clearly Sargent's managing agent for purposes of this case. 
Finally, Faler's Firm argues that it should not be held an insider because it found no 
cases holding lawyers as insiders. This is not surprising. For a lawyer to take a security 
interest in all of his client's assets three days into trial is outrageous. The absence of a 
reported case holding a lawyer as an insider under such circumstances certainly does not 
preclude such a holding in this case. 
VIII. FALER'S FIRM'S UNEXPLAINED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ARE 
FURTHER EVIDENCE THE SECURITY AGREEMENT IS FRAUDULENT. 
At the time of his motion, memorandum and affidavit dated February 21,2008, 
Faler's attorney's fees and costs were $135,91 7.62.15 As of May 14,2008, Faler's Firm 
claims to have incurred an additional $12,004.00 in attorney's fees since February 2008.16 
Thus, by Faler's own representations, his attorney's fees and cost to date should be 
$1 47,921.62. However, as of one month ago, on April 10,2008, Faler's Firm claimed a 
security interest in Sargent's assets in the amount of $190,874.58 for unpaid attorney's fees 
14 See p. 4 of High Valley's Brief In Support Of Motion To Contest Claim Of Exemption And Third-Party 
Claim Of Exemption, already on file with the court. 
15 See p. 7 of the Motion, Memorandum of Fees and Costs and Affidavit for Attorney Fees and Costs on 
Behalf of Cary Sargent in Both the Matter of Sargent v. B ~ C K  and in the Matter of High Valley Concrete, 
LLC v. Sargent, already on file with the court. 
16 See p. 9 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court. 
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and costs.I7 Faler's Firm provides no explanation for the $42,952.96 difference in the 
attorney's fees and costs it claimed a month ago in its third party claim of exemption 
compared to the amount it reports now. The unexplained $42,952.96 is further evidence of 
the security agreement is fraudulent. Faler's Firm's third party claim of exemption 
oversecures Faler's Firm because the $190,874.58 does not accurately reflect Faler's Firm's 
actual attorney's fees and costs to Sargent. The only thing that makes sense is that Faler's 
Firm is exaggerating its security interest to defraud creditors by making Sargent even more 
judgment proof. The unexplained $42,952.96 may also include prospective security for the 
additional "$20,000.00 to $30,000.00" in attorney's fees and costs Faler's Firm expects to 
incur-and Sargent to not pay-in a future appeal. 
Moreover, Judge Moss previously disqualified Faler from representing Glendale 
because of a conflict. Later, in Glendale's post-trial memorandum of attorney's fees and 
costs, Faler attempted to pass $19,987.82 of his attorney's fees and costs through Glendale. 
However, Judge St. Clair disallowed all of the attorney's fees and costs claimed from Faler. 
Now, it seems Faler's Firm may be attempting to smuggle its disallowed Glendale charges 
into its security agreement with Sargent to further prevent High Valley from collecting on its 
judgment. 
Finally, this court ruled only $51,989.50 of Faler's attorney's fees and costs were 
reasonable. Nonetheless, Faler's Firm claims to be secured in the amount of $190,874.58. 
The fact that Faler's Firm is so ridiculously oversecured for the reasonable value of its 
attorney's fees and costs is fiu-ther evidence of the fraudulent nature of the security 
agreement. 
17 See p. 2 of Third Party Claim of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC, already on file with the court. 
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Faler's Firm argues that it gave adequate consideration from the security agreement 
with sargent.I8 While the adequacy of consideration may be an argument for challenging 
contracts generally, High Valley has not asserted this challenge here. Rather, High Valley 
submits that the security interest is invalid under Section 55-914(2) of Idaho's UFTA. The 
adequacy of the consideration is irrelevant to the present motion. 
Also, Faler's Firm's makes an argument based on Idaho Code Section 55-91 3.19 
However, High Valley's challenge to the security interest is based on Section 55-914(2). 
Section 55-91 3 is an entirely different code section with different requirements. Faler's 
Firm's argument is irrelevant in this regard. 
Further, Faler's Firm claims that while the security interest was in part to secure 
payment of Sargent's antecedent debt, it was intended to secure hture debts as well.2o All 
that Section 55-914(2) requires is that the debtor's transfer to the insider be for an 
antecedent debt. Faler's Firm concedes that the transfer was primarily to secure the 
payment of the antecedent debt. Faler's Firm's future charges to Sargent for hture services 
is irrelevant. 
Faler's Firm also discusses, albeit irrelevantly and erroneously, the percentage of 
High Valley's recovery in relation to its claim. (High Valley sought $332,360.32 in 
damages, not $600,000.00 as Faler's Finn alleges. The jury awarded $48,98 1.16, resulting 
in a recovery percentage to High Valley of 1 596, not 8% as Faler's Firm suggests.) The 
18 See pp. 3-4 and 10 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the 
court. 
19 See pp. 9-10 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court. 
20 See pp. 8-9 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court. 
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extent to which the jury agreed with High Valley's claims is irrelevant to whether the 
security interest from Sargent to Faler three days into trial is a voidable, fraudulent transfer. 
X. CONCLUSION. 
Based on the foregoing, the court should grant High Valley's motion and deny the 
claim of exemption and the third-party claim of exemption. 
DATED this d D  day of May, 2008. 
McGRATH, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
By: L, 
B. ,jf! driscoll 
Atorneys for High Valley Concrete, LLC 
and Doyle Beck 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 38 day of May, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing KEPLY BFUEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
CONTEST CLAIM OF EXEMPTION AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM OF 
EXEMPTION to be served by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in 
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or 
overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
[ 4 . s .  Mail William D. Faler, Esq. 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN 
[ ] Overnight Delivery & CRAPO, PLLC 
[ ] Hand Delivery P.O. Box 50130 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUD PISTRICT . . I 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE FREMONE - -  
rleputy Clerk , 
- ----- 
1. FACTS 
Cary Sargent was awarded a judgment on his claim against Doyle Beck in Case 
No. CV-07-0118. This judgment was amended ("Amended Judgment"). High Valley 
sought to levy on Sargent's Amended Judgment. In response, Sargent filed a claim of 
exemption and the law firm representing Sargent, Faler's Firm, filed a third-party claim 
of exemption. Sargent's exemption claim did not mention the Amended Judgment, but 
Faler's Firm's third-party exemption claim did. The Firm's exemption claim alleged that 
the Amended Judgment was exempt because it was security for attorney fees Sargent 
the f i r m D O c l l f , j , ~ ~ ~  
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
CARY SARGENT, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOYLE BECK, 
Defendant. 
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Case No. CV-02-0484 & 
Case No. CV-07-0118 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
High Valley challenges the third-party exemption claiming it violated the rules of 
professional conduct, failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 1 1-203, and qualified 
as a fraudulent transfer. 
2. DISCUSSION 
1. Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) does not forbid the security 
agreement between Mr. Sargent and Mr. Faler. 
"A lawyer shall not . . . knowingly acquire [a] security or other pecuniary interest 
adverse to a client."' Faler's Firm has a security interest in over $190,000 of its client's, 
Mr. Sargent's, property. It is easy to see potential conflicts of interest between the Firm's 
interest in Sargent's property and Sargent's interests. But, Rule 1.8(a) requires a live 
adverse interest, and there is no evidence before the Court that such a conflict currently 
exists. The Faler-Sargent security agreement does not presently violate Rule 1.8(a). 
2. Faler's Firm's third-party exemption claim satisfied the requirements of 
Idaho Code Section 11-203. 
Section 1 1-203 places several obligations on one claiming an exemption from a 
levy. One requirement is that the individual name the property being claimed as exempt. 
High Valley correctly argues that Sargent's Claim of Exemption fails to mention 
Sargent's Amended Judgment. Since the only property High Valley sought to levy 
against was Sargent's judgment, and since Sargent failed to claim the judgment exempt, 
Sargent may not claim the judgment as an exemption. 
However, Faler's Firm may claim the exemption as a third-party claim, which 
they have. There is no reason why Sargent's failure to include the Amended Judgment 
should affect Faler's Firm's exemption claim when the firm included it in its third-party 
claim. The firm satisfied the procedural requirements of Section 1 1-203 in claiming its 
exemption. 
1 ~ r l - h ~  P Z I P  n f p r n f ~ c ~ i n n a l  C]nnd~~ct Rule 1.8(a) (emphasis added). 
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3. The Faler-Sargent security agreement was not an unlawful transfer because 
Faler's Firm is not an insider. 
High Valley moves the Court to avoid the Faler-Sargent security agreement and 
deny Faler's Firm's third-party claim of exemption per Idaho's Unlawful Transfers Act. 
There are four prerequisites for an unlawful t r an~fe r .~  The prerequisite the Court focuses 
on is the requirement that the transfer must be to an insider. 
The Act includes several definitions of insider, but only one is applicable here: a 
managing agent is an insider.l The Act fails to define managing agent. So the issue the 
Court must decide is whether Faler's Firm was Mr. Sargent's managing agent. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines managing agent as "[a] person with the general 
power involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as opposed to an ordinary agent 
who acts under the direction and control of the principal."4 
As High Valley's counsel argues in its brief, an attorney exercises "judgment and 
discretion" for the benefit of a client, the principal. For example, an effective, efficient 
attorney exercises "judgment and discretion" when he advises a client to settle rather than 
incur the costs of lengthy litigation. However, it does not follow that this exercise of 
"judgment and discretion" turns the attorney into his client's managing agent. Clients 
may snub counsel, reject settlement offers, and continue a protracted wrangle. Attorneys 
do not exercise "judgment and discretion" over their clients-attorneys are under the 
direction and control of their clients. 
Attorneys are agents, but they are limited agents.5 Attorneys are limited in the 
scope of their client's representation: a lawyer "shall abide by a client's decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation . . . shall consult with the client as to the 
means by which they are to be pursued . . . may take such action on behalf of the client as 
is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation," and "shall abide by a client's 
decision whether to settle a matter."6 Rule 1.2(a) "confers upon the client the ultimate 
* I.C. 55-914(2). 
I.C. 5 55-910(7)(e). 
4 Black's Law Dictionary (8' Ed.). 
5 Id. (see definitions of attorney and agent). 
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authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits 
imposed by law and the lawyer's professional ~ b l i ~ a t i o n s . " ~  Attorneys are under the 
direction and control of their clients; attorneys are not managing agents. 
Here, the Court has nothing before it to suggest that Faler's Firm is anything more 
than Mr. Sargent's agent. The Firm does not manage, direct, or control Mr. Sargent. 
Consequently, Faler's Firm is not an insider and the Faler-Sargent security agreement is 
not an unlawful transfer. High Valley's motion to contest the exemption and the third- 
party claim of exemption is denied. 
3. CONCLUSION 
High Valley failed to establish that the Faler-Sargent security agreement is an 
unlawful transfer. High Valley's motion to contest the exemption and the third-party 
claim of exemption is denied. 
Dated this / D  day of July, 2008. A 
s Brent J. Moss 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision was served upon the following individuals via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on 
this JfL day of July, 2008, unless otherwise indicated: 
Bryan D. Smith 
B.J. Driscoll 
P.O. Box 50731 
4 14 Schoup Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
John Ohrnan 
P.O. Box 5 1600 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
William D. Faler 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Clerk of the Court 
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CASE ASSIGNED TO 
JUDGE GREGORY S. ANDERSON 
William D. Faler, Esq. 
Idaho State Bar No. 1464 
fjOLDEN, KIDWELL, EiAIfN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Mailing Address: 
P. 0. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-01 30 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-95 18 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CARY SARGENT, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOYLE BECK and MARK FULLER, 
Defendants. 
~ - C V O ~  - 11 8 
Case No. CV-06- ; :'4 tr 
COMPLAINT 
Filing Category A-1 
Filing Fee: $82.00 
COMES NOW the above named Plaintiff and for cause of action against the above 
named Defendants alleges as follows: 
1. At all times herein mentioned Plaintiff, Cary Sargent, (hereafter "Sargent") was 
and now is a resident of the State of Idaho. 
2. Defendant, Doyle Beck, (hereafter "Beck") is a resident of Bonneville County, 
Idaho. 
3. Defendant, Mark Fuller, (hereafter "Fuller") is a resident of Bonneville County, 
Idaho. 
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4. In 1997, Sargent was approached by Beck regarding putting together a concrete 
business with a batch plant and some concrete trucks Beck owned. 
5.  Beck and Sargent decided in March 1997 to form a new concrete company with 
the ownership to be divided 5 1 % for Beck and 49% for Sargent to be known as High Valley 
Concrete, LLC. 
6. On March 24, 1997, Beck and Sargent had Fuller organize High Valley Concrete, 
LLC. 
7. A few days later on April 3, 1997, Sargent was asked to meet with Beck and 
Fuller, the attorney who was representing both Beck and Sargent. 
8. At the meeting with Beck and Fuller, Beck and Fuller recommended that instead 
of issuing 49% of the Limited Liability Company units to Sargent, that all of the Limited 
Liability Company units be placed in Beck's name because Beck could better utilize any tax 
deductions in the early years of the business Beck and Fuller stated that if Sargent agreed to have 
his units issued or transferred to Beck, the units would be transferred back to Sargent after a few 
years. 
9. Sargent agreed and Fuller immediately pulled documents out of the desk for 
Sargent to sign so that all units of ownershp were placed in Beck's name. 
10. By acting as described in paragraphs 2 through 9 of this Complaint, Beck and 
Fuller assumed a fiduciary duty toward Sargent for Sargent's contributions to and interest in 
High Valley Concrete, LLC. 
11. As a result of the representations and promises of Beck and Fuller: 
a. Sargent contributed to High Valley Concrete, LLC $26,065.00 from the 
buyout of his interest in another business ownership. 
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b. Sargent made other monetary contributions into High Valley Concrete, 
LLC., and 
c. Sargent made other equipment and labor contributions into High Valley 
Concrete, LLC. jv : .:1 2 
12. All of the contributions were made by Sargent on the b 3 o f  ~ e c k  and Fuller 
holding his interest for him. 
13. Thereafter, Sargent managed High Valley Concrete, LLC. 
14. On February 22,2002, Beck removed Sargent as the manager of High Valley 
Concrete, LLC and since that date Beck has refused to allow Sargent access to the business, and 
has refused to re-pay Sargent his contribution to the business. 
15. Beck and Fuller breached the fiduciary duty to Sargent by not protecting Sargent's 
interest in High Valley Concrete, LLC, and not accounting to Sargent for his monetary and 
property contributions to High Valley Concrete, LLC. 
16. As a result of the breach of the fiduciary duty by Beck and Mark Fuller, Sargent 
has been damaged by the loss of his contributions to High Valley Concrete, LLC in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
That as a further and proximate result of the negligence of Defendants, and each of them, 
it has been necessary for plaintiffs to retain an attorney, William D. Faler of Holden, Kidwell, 
Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., to initiate and prosecute this action; that pursuant to the provisions of 
Idaho Code Section 12- 120(3) and 12- 12 1 and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff is 
entitled to recover their court costs and the sum of $2,500.00 for attorney fees in the event of a 
default and for a greater sum to be determined by the Court in the event the matter is litigated. 
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WHEREI;ORE, Plaintiff prays the judgment, order and decree of this court against 
Defendants (jointly and severally) as follows: 
1. For judgment against Defendants in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2. For attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12- 120(3) and/or 12- 12 I in the 
amount of $2,500.00 in the event of default or such other sum as set by the Court in the event this 
matter is litigated. 
3. For costs of suit incurred herein; and 
4. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable. 
L! 
DATED this 22 day of February, 2006. ,' - $( 
/ &( ' ' / u ' L  f 
~ i l l i a m  D:FP& ' 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
Verification 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Cary Sargent being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states: 
That I am the Plaintiff in this matter, that I have read the foregoing Verified Complaint, 
know the contents thereof and believe them to be true and correct to the best of my belief. 
N' SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN TO before me this 27 day of February, 2006. 
~ b t a r ~  Public for ldahoH 
(Seal) Residing at: Bye ,. , YD - 
My Commission Expires: 9/3/7389 
7- '- 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury of not less than twelve ( 1  2) persons as to all 
issues triable to a jury in this matter. 
J2 DATED THIS zz day of February, 2006. 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
( J  \WPI)ATA\W)RI O827Sargent\Caunter Su~t\Cornplaint wpd 
William D. Faler, Esq. 
Idaho State Bar No. 1464 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Mailing Address: 
P. 0 .  Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-01 30 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-95 18 
I Attorneys for Defendant Cary Sargent 
C O U ~ Q  of Fremont State of Idaho 
Filed: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, LLC., an 
Idaho Limited Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-02-00484 
SARGENT'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT 
I Comes Now ~ e f e n d i t  Cary Sargent, and hereby moves the Court for a judgment I notwithstanding the verdict in the matter of High Valley Concrete, LLC v. Sargent pursuant Idaho I Rules of Civil Procedure 59(c). I The basis for the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is insufficiency of 
evidence to justify the return of a verdict against Defendant Sargent on the claim of fraud. 
Dated this &';iay of February, 2008. 
William D. Faler 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or 
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailingor by facsimile, with the 
correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on this 2/ '' day of February, 2008. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Bryan D. Smith 
B.J. Driscoll 
McGrath, Meacham, Smith, P.L.L.C . 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
[ U. S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Other 
John M. Ohman 
Cox Ohman & Brandstetter 
P.O. Box 5 1600 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1 600 
[ a U. S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ]Other 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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I Attorneys for Defendant Cary Sargent 
William D. Faler, Esq. 
Idaho State Bar No. 1464 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
mail in^ Address: 
P. 0 .  Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0 130 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., 
an Idaho Limited Liability Company 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
r 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Bonneville ) 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
DISTRICT SEVEN COURT 
County of Fremont State of Idaho 
Filed: 
fE82 la008 
By: 
Case No. CV-02-00484 
- 
9 
: 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM 
D. FALER IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT 
- Deputy Clerk 
I William D. Faler, first being duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
. -  - . -  -2 
Facsimile: (208) 523-95 18 
1. That the statements made herein are based upon personal knowledge unless 
specifically stated otherwise. 
2. 1 served as counsel for Defendant Cary Sargent in the matter tried before the Court 
from January 23 through February 1,2008. 
3. That during the trial, Defendant Sargent was severely limited by the number of 
witnesses he could call as a result of the Court's limitation of Defendant Sargent's case to only one 
ORIGINAL 
Affidavit of William D. Faler in Support of Motion for New Trial 
and Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict -.., 
n--- rlnc 
4. That prior to the trial, then presiding Judge Brent Moss, specifically stated that 
I enough time would be set aside to allow the parties to present their witnesses and evidence. 
5 .  The Plaintiff, High Valley Concrete, LLC, was allowed three and one-half days in 
I which to present its witnesses and its evidence. 
6. Defendant Sargent was allowed only one and one-half to present his witnesses and 
his evidence and to respond to the evidence presented by High Valley Concrete, LLC and Doyle 
I Beck. As a result of such limitation Defendant Cary Sargent was denied the ability to present a 
number of his witnesses, denied the ability to respond to each of the claims made by High Valley 
I Concrete, denied adequate time to rebut the testimony presented by High Valley Concrete, and I thus was denied the ability to obtain a fair trial. I 7. The evidence at trial does not support a verdict based on fraud in light of the jury's I findings as to Glendale. High Valley Concrete, LLC's Second Amended Complaint pleads a 
fraudulent concealment count as follows: 
"39. Specifically, Sargent had a duty to disclose that he was engaging in the 
wrongful conduct as herein alleged. 
40. Sargent breached his duty to disclose material facts to High Valley be failing to 
disclose his wrongful conduct as alleged herein. 
41. High Valley was justifiably induced to act in the business transaction by the 
nondisclosure of material facts as herein alleged." 
(Emphasis added). 
8. No evidence was presented at trial as to any business transaction that High Valley 
was induced to enter into other than: a) the allegedly false leases of Glendale equipment, b) the 
payments made by High Valley to Glendale shortly before Cary Sargent was forced out of High 
Valley Concrete, c) the transferred of truck tires to Glendale in payment of what was owed to 
2- Affidavit of William D. Faler in Support of Motion for New Trial and in Support of Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
Affidavit of William D. Faler in Support of Motion for New Trial 
and Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
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Glendale, and d) the repair of Glendale mixer trucks that were later used by Cary Sargent 
personally. 
9. The jury specifically found that no civil conspiracy occurred between Cary Sargent 
and Glendale, and that Glendale did not convert any assets of High Valley. 
10. Given the findings as to no civil conspiracy and no conversion in the dealings with 
Glendale, it is legally impossible for fraud by Cary Sargent to have occurred in those transactions 
as implicit in the jury's verdict is a finding that the conduct of Cary Sargent was not wrongful, ie: 
that the leases were valid, the payments were valid, the transfer of the truck tires was valid, and the 
repair of the Glendale trucks was valid. 
1 1. Additionally, no evidence was presented to show that the payment of a valid debt is 
somehow unlawful, even if it was done instead of paying an owner of the company. 
12. Therefore, the Court should grant a new trial on the claims of conversion by Cary 
Sargent, unjust enrichment of Cary Sargent, and breach of fiduciary duty. 
13. The Court should also grant Sargent's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict and dismiss the fraud count. 
Dated this of February, 2008. 
/' 
-.----- 
William & ~ a l e r  
rd SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2 day of February, 2008. 
Residing at: 
Commission Expires: 
3- . Faler in Support of Motion for New Trial and in Support of Motion for 
anding the Verdict 
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lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., 
an Idaho Limited Liability Company 
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CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
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CARY SARGENT, 
Plaintiff, 
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DOYLE BECK, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-07-118 
SARGENT'S MOTION FOR 
ADDITUR 
Comes Now Plaintiff Cary Sargent, and hereby moves the Court for an Additur in the 
matter of Cary Sargent v. Doyle Beck pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a), 59(e), and 
59.1. 
The basis for this motion for an Additur is that the jury having found that Doyle Back had a 
fiduciary duty to Cary Sargent regarding Cary Sargent's interest in High Valley Concrete,LLC, 
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should have awarded Cary Sargent the additional amounts Sargent proved that he had contributed 
to High Valley Concrete, LLC, such amount being $37,746.12, and as more fully set forth in the 
Affidavit of William D. Faler in Support of Motion for Additur filed herein. 
- 
Dated this a s d a y  of February, 2008. 
V 
William D. Faler 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C O m T Y  OF FREMONT 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., 
an Idaho Limited Liability Company 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant. - 
CARY SARGENT, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOYLE BECK, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-07-118 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM 
D. FALER IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ADDITUR 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS 
County of Bonneville ) 
William D. Faler, first being duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
ORIGINAL 
1 .  That the statements made herein are based upon personal knowledge unless 
specifically stated otherwise. 
2. I served as counsel for Cary Sargent in the matter tried before the Court from 
January 23 through February 1,2008. 
3. The trial was conducted for the purpose of resolving two separate cases which had 
previously been consolidated for trial as Fremont County Case No. CV-07-118, namely: 
a. High Valley Concrete, LLC v. Cary Sargent and Glendale Construction, 
Fremont County Case No. CV-02-484; and 
b. Cary Sargent v. Doyle Beck, Bonneville County Case No. CV-06-1046. 
4. The jury determined that Doyle Beck owed Cary Sargent a duty to protect Cary 
Sargent's interest in High Valley Concrete, LLC, after he arranged for Cary Sargent's ownership 
interest in High Valley Concrete, LLC to be transferred to him (Doyle Beck) so that 100% of the 
units of ownership were in Doyle Beck's name. 
5. After finding that a fiduciary duty was owed by Doyle Beck to Cary Sargent, the 
jury found that Doyle Beck had breached such fiduciary duty. 
6. The jury then awarded damages for the breach of such fiduciary duty in the amount 
of $28,896.88. 
7. A review of the items of damage sought by Cary Sargent for the breach of fiduciary 
duty shows that a total of $79,571 .OO was sought by Cary Sargent. 
8. Eliminating the items of damage related to the exchange of vehicles and parts for 
the repair services of Kirk Sargent in the amount of $6,928.00, and the undocumented cash spent 
for parts, service, etc. of $6,000.00, leaves the sum of $66,643 as damages that were established by 
the evidence. 
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9. Thus the Court should grant an additur of $37,746.12, increasing Sargent's damages 
to $66,643.00. 
./ 
Dated this &&day of February, 2008. 
-\------ 
William D. Faler 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 21 5f day of February, 2008. 
Residing at: -- 
Commission Expires: 9-Zf-Z& 
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IN TI IIi DISTRICT COURT 01: TI 1E SEVEN'I'I I JUDICIAL, DISTRIC'T 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CARY SARGENT, AND GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendants. I 
CARY SARGENT, I 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOYLE BECK and MARK FULLER, 
Defendants. I 
FILED IN CHAMBERS 
at Idaho Falls 
Bonneville County 
D,, 3-37- 0 %  
Time \ ;gGam 
Deputy clerk  
Case No. CV-02-0484 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Case No. CV-07-0 1 18 
On February 1,2008, the jury returned a verdict in case CV-02-0484 for High 
Valley Concrete, L.L.C. ("High Valley") against Cary Sargent ("Sargent") on claims of 
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and unjust enrichment; and awarded High 
Valley $48,98 1.1 6 in damages. The jury returned a verdict of no liability as to Glendale 
Construction, Inc. ("Glendale"), but found that Glendale should return to High Valley an 
LlO motor, a transfer case and a CAT 3306 motor. In case CV-07-0118, the jury 
returned a verdict for Sargent against Doyle Beck ("Beck") on a claim of breach of 
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fiduciary duty, and awarded Sargent $28,896.88. On February 6,2008, the Court entered 
judgments on both verdicts. 
On February 8,2008, in case CV-02-0484 Glendale filed an affidavit for 
attorneys fees and costs signed by counsel John Ohman claiming $47,925.00 attorney 
fees and $3,27 1.48 discretionary costs incurred through attorney Ohrnan, and claiming 
$19,038.50 attorney fees, $742.35 costs of right, and $206.97 discretionary costs 
incurred through former attorney William Faler. On February 20,2008, High Valley filed 
an objection and motion to disallow Glendale's attorney fees and costs, supported by 
affidavits of Bryan Smith, Doyle Beck and Clint Tavener and deposition excerpts. The 
claim, objection and motion were orally argued on March 4, 2008. 
On February 20,2008, in case CV-02-0484 Sargent filed a motion for JNOV 
against the jury's verdict of liability on High Valley's fraud claim. In case CV-07-0118 
Sargent filed under Rule 59 and 59. I, I.R.C.P. a motion seeking an additur of $37,746.12. 
These motions were supported by the affidavit of counsel. Sargent also filed in both cases 
a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a)(l), I.R.C.P., based on irregularity in the 
proceeding for not having enough time to present Sargent's evidence, and a 
memorandum of attorney fees and costs claiming in case CV-02-0484 $79,975.00 
attorney fees, $1,762.9 1 costs of right, and $185.78 discretionary costs; and claiming in 
case CV-07-0118 $5 1,989.50 attorney fees, $1,818.65 costs of right, and $1 85.78 
discretionary costs. On March 3, 2008, High Valley and Beck filed a brief in opposition 
to Sargent's motions, and an objection and motion to disallow fees and costs. The parties 
stipulated that these motions could be decided without further oral argument upon the 
record and additional briefs to be filed by March loth and 17'. 
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Also on February 20,2008, in case CV-02-0484, High Valley filed a motion for 
prejudgment interest on its $48,981.16 verdict and judgment, supported by the affidavit 
of counsel. In Case CV-07-0118 Beck filed a motion for JNOV against the jury's verdict 
of $28,896.88 based n not being supported by substantial evidence, supported by the 
affidavit of counsel. Lastly, in case CV-02-0484 High Valley filed a memorandum of 
fees and costs, affidavit of counsel, and a motion for award of fees and costs, claiming 
against both Sargent and Glendale $1 07,955.00 attorney fees, $9,540.26 costs of right 
and $3,341.91 discretionary costs. On March 10, 2008, Sargent filed a brief in opposition 
to these claims and motions. On March 17,2008, High Valley filed a reply brief. The 
parties stipulated that these motions could be decided without further oral argument upon 
the record and additional briefs to be filed by March loth and 17" by the parties. 
On March 10,2008, Sargent filed a post hearing brief opposing Beck's motion for 
JNOV, and opposing High Valley's motion for prejudgment interest and request for 
attorney fees. On March 17,2008, High Valley and Beck filed a post hearing brief in 
response. 
Having reviewed the pleadings, the Court's notes of the trial evidence, the jury's 
verdicts, the parties' post trial motions, memoranda of fees and costs, affidavits, written 
briefs, and oral argument, the Court issues the following memorandum decision on all 
pending motions for JNOV, new trial, additur, and interest; and the Court hereby settles 
the costs and attorney fees sought by the parties. 
11. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rules 59(a), I.R.C.P., authorizes the trial court to grant any party a new trial on all 
or part of the issues in an action on a showing of any one of seven specific grounds. The 
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decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a) generally rests within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. Davis v. Sun Valley Ski Educ. Foundation, Inc., 
130 Idaho 400,405, 941 P.2d 1301, 1306 (1 997); Rott v. Idaho State Building Authority, 
128 Idaho 580,589,917 P.2d 737,746 (1 996); O'Dell v. Basabe, 1 19 Idaho 796,8 13, 
8 10 P.2d 1082,1099 (1 99 1); Quick v. Crane, 1 1 1 Idaho 759.766,727 P.2d 1 187, 1 194 
(1986). The trial court must act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistent with any applicable legal standards, using an exercise of reason. State v. 
Hedger, 11 5 Idaho 598, 600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1 989); Leavitt v. Swain, supra at 719, 
963 P.2d at 1203. The trial court must distinguish between the various grounds upon 
which a motion for new trial is based. Stewart v. Rice, 120 Idaho 504, 507, 81 7 P.2d 
170, 173 (1991). 
Rule 59(a)(l), I.R.C.P., authorizes a new trial for irregularity in the proceedings 
of the court, jury or adverse party or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by 
which a party was deprived of a fair trial. 
Rule 59(a)(6) authorizes a new trial because the evidence was insufficient to 
justify the verdict or that it is against the law. In ruling on motion under this ground, the 
trial court must weigh all the evidence, including the judge's own determination of the 
credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the verdict is supported by the 
evidence. Bott v. Idaho State Building Authority, 128 Idaho at 589, 917 P.2d at 746. In 
order to grant a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court must 
determine both (1) the jury verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, and (2) a 
new trial would produce a different result. Heitz v. Carroll, 11 7 Idaho 373, 378, 788 P.2d 
188, 193 (1 990). 
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Rule 59(a) expressly states that any motion made under subdivisions (1) (3) and 
(4) must be accompanied by an affidavit stating in detail the facts relied upon, and a 
motion under subdivisions (6) and (7) must set forth the factual grounds therefore with 
particularity. 
Where a jury award is based on substantial and competent evidence, but the 
damage award is based on passion and prejudice and the amount is so disparately low to 
what the trial judge would have awarded so as to shock the conscience of the trial judge, 
under Rule 59(a), the trial 'ourt may grant an additur in damages as a condition to 
denying a motion for new trial. Collins v. Jones, 131 Idaho 556, 961 P.2d 647 (1998). 
The decision is discretionary, and entails the trial judge's subjective evaluation of the 
evidence and the judge's sense of fairness. Id. 
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) under Rule 50(b), 
I.R.C.P., is simply a delayed motion for directed verdict that admits the truth of the non 
moving party's evidence and reasonable inferences; and requires the trial court to 
determine as a matter of law whether there was sufficient evidence for reasonable minds 
to have reached the verdict. Beco Constr. Co. v. Harper Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 
936 P.2d 202 (Ct.App. 1997). The trial court is not free to weigh the evidence or pass on 
the credulity of witnesses in making his own findings of fact, as would be the case in 
ruling on a motion for new trial. Smith v. Praeaitzer, 1 13 Idaho 887, 749 P.2d 10 12 
(Ct.App. 1988). 
111. ANALYSIS 
A. SARGENT'S MOTION FOR JNOV ON FRAUD IN CV-02-484. 
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Sargent argues in his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to High 
Valley's fraud count that because the jury found no civil conspiracy with Glendale and 
found Glendale not liable for conversion or unjust enrichment, then there could be no 
fraud finding against Sargent. In opposition High Valley argues that there was sufficient 
competent evidence for the jury to find that Sargent committed fraud against High Valley 
by taking a larger salary, paying for personal expenses, paying excessive money and 
delivering equipment to Glendale without return consideration, and taking High Valley's 
equipment without knowledge and approval by the limited liability company's members. 
Although the facts were conflicting, there were substantial and competent facts 
admitted into evidence for the jury to find as argued by High Valley. Therefore, the 
motion must be denied. 
B. SARGENT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN BOTH CASES 
Sargent7s motion for new trial in both cases argues under Rule 59(a)(l) that there 
was an irregularity in the proceedings because Sargent did not have enough time to call 
additional witnesses. In opposition, High Valley and Beck argue that Sargent waived this 
ground for new trial by assuring the trial judge and other parties each day, until the last 
day, that there was enough time to present his evidence. 
Because Sargent has not presented any affidavit from any proposed witness who 
was unable to testify, nor does Sargent7s counsel's affidavit delineate, any specific 
material facts that were not submitted into evidence, this Court cannot find any prejudice 
to Sargent resulting from the trial witness schedule. Further, this Court cannot determine 
how a retrial would produce any different result. 
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Sargent's motion for new trial in CV-02-484 also argues under Rule 59(a)(6) that 
there was insufficient evidence to justify I-Iigh Valley's verdicts for fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duty, conversion and unjust enrichment. In opposition, High Valley argues that 
Sargent has not supported his motion with the required factual particularity, and that 
although the evidence was conflicting it was sufficient to support findings that Sargent 
wrongfully took money and property of High Valley. This Court agrees with High 
Valley's arguments, and concludes that substantial competent evidence was admitted to 
support the jury's verdicts on those counts against Sargent as well as the amount of 
compensatory damages. 
Therefore, Sargent's motion for new trial must be denied. 
C. SARGENT'S MOTION FOR ADDITUR IN CV-07-118 
Sargent's motion for additur under Rule 59.1 in case CV-07-118 argues that based 
on his evidence of damages totaling $66,643 that the jury's verdict of $28,896.88 was 
inadequate, and the Court should grant an additur of $37,746.12. In opposition, Beck 
argues that an additur is proper only when the trial court would have granted more 
damages based its own evaluation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses, and the 
jury's verdict is so low that it "shocks the conscience of the court" after comparing the 
two amounts. 
The court specifically asked the parties at a hearing on March 4th to address how 
the jury arrived at their damages verdict of $28, 896.88, and to explain what evidence the 
jury had to determine the net worth of High Valley in February, 2002. Sargent's post 
hearing brief provided little help to the Court, by stating that "it does not matter," because 
the jury "could decide to award Sargent anywhere between $1 .OO to $79,000.00," and the 
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jury "could make its award based upon either the contribution made by Cary Sargent or 
the financial worth of the company at the time [February 22,20021 Beck removed 
Sargent as the [LLC] manager." 
It is important to note that the party seeking an additur has the burden to 
demonstrate why his evidence was so compelling that the trial judge should find that 
additional damages should be found and that the jury's verdict is shockingly low so as to 
have been rendered on passion or prejudice. See Collins v. Jones, 13 1 Idaho 556, 96 1 
P.2d 647 (1998). This Court accepts the jury's verdict that Beck, as the owner of the 
majority of limited liability company units, and as holder of Sargent's 49% interest, 
breached his fiduciary duty owed to Sargent. However, in determining Sargent's 
damages, the Court would need to find the net worth of High Valley in February, 2002. 
Sargent's proof only suggested that High Valley made a 2001 profit of $75,000, and 
Beck's evidence only suggested that High Valley's tax returns showed a loss for 2001, 
and during the 5 years Sargent managed High Valley it lost $66 1,000. 
To correctly decide Sargent's motion, the Court considers competent evidence of 
the fair market value of all of High Valley assets and competent evidence of High 
Valley's debts at a time close to February, 2002 in order to determine High Valley's net 
worth. The arguments of the parties are of little help, because the parties focus only on 
the profits and losses of High Valley. The Court's review of the evidence finds little 
pertinent information to determine High Valley's net worth in February, 2002. The Court 
also heard uncontroverted evidence that three creditors forced High Valley into 
bankruptcy, but that High Valley came out of bankruptcy to pursue this action. The Court 
concludes that High Valley had some net worth in February, 2002, but later was unable to 
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pay bills to keep out of bankruptcy. Based on its own independent determination of the 
credibility of the witnesses and the exhibits admitted, the Court would have found that 
High Valley's net worth in February, 2002 was less than $50,000.00. The Court would 
have found Sargent's damages, based on a loss of 49% of such net worth, was less than 
$25,000.00. The jury's verdict does not shock the Court's conscience as being 
unreasonably low. 
Further, the Court observes that the jury awarded High Valley nearly $49,000.00 
against Sargent for breaching his fiduciary duty as High Valley's manager. The jury may 
have considered High Valley's damages as an asset, and added those damages into High 
Valley's net worth as of February, 2002. In other words the jury may have determined 
that Sargent had a 49% interest in the approximately $49,000 verdict, plus another $6,000 
or $7,000 of assets over liabilities. Thus, the jury could have fashioned both verdicts so 
that both Beck and Sargent bear responsibility for the failure of High Valley. That is a 
reasonable approach, and the jury's finding in CV-07-118 does not shock the conscience 
of this Court. Sargent's motion for additur must be denied. 
D. HIGH VALLEY'S MOTION FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN 
CV-02-484 
High Valley's motion for prejudgment interest argues under Idaho Code 28-22- 
104(1) that the $48,981.16 in damages found by the jury against Sargent was liquidated 
or readily ascertainable by mere mathematical process. In opposition, Sargent argues that 
the damages were only arrived at by discretion and determining which valuation evidence 
to believe. 
Having listened to all the evidence at trial, and having looked at the exhibits, and 
having listened to closing arguments rendered to the jury, this Court has no idea which 
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items of money or property the jury found to have been wrongfully taken by Sargent in 
order to calculate at its damages verdict. The evidence was conflicting as to what money 
and property Sargent took from High Valley and why, and the values of such monies and 
property was conflicting and much of it based on opinion evidence. It was a classic case 
of unliquidated damages for which prejudgment interest has repeated been denied by 
Idaho Courts. See Opportunity, LLC v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 38 P.3d 1258 
(2002); Bouten Const. Co. v. H.F. Mannuson Co., 133 Idaho 756,762,992 P.2d 75 1, 
757 (1999); Farm Dev. Cow. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 91 8,920,478 P.2d 298,300 
(1 970). 
Therefore, the Court must deny High Valley's motion for prejudgment interest. 
E. BECK'S MOTION FOR JNOV IN CV-07-118 
Beck's motion for JNOV in case CV-07-118 against Sargent's verdict for $28, 
896.88 argues that 1) High Valley's operating agreement in sections 3.05 and 10.03 
provide that a member may demand return of his capital contribution only from the 
company's property, and has no recourse against any other member; 2) Sargent7s only 
remedy was to sue Beck in the name of High Valley; 3) Beck was not the manager of 
High Valley so under Idaho Code 53-622(3) he owed no duty to Sargent; 4) if Beck 
acted wrongfully as to High Valley, then under Idaho Code 53-659 only High Valley has 
a cause of action against him; 5) if Beck acted wrongfully by not issuing 49% of the 
units to Sargent, there were no damages caused because High Valley lost $661,000 over 
its 5 years of operation; 5) Beck and Sargent were essentially partners and Sargent's 
only remedy was to have the partnership wound up and an accounting completed; and 6) 
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at best Sargent's only damages would be 49% of High Valley's profit, which was 
negative, due to $661,000 in losses cumulative from 1997 to 2002. 
In opposition, Sargent argues that his claim is based on the oral agreement with 
Beck to hold Sargent's 49% interest for a few years so Beck could deduct 100% of 
losses, and then return Sargent's 49% interest, so the operating agreement does not limit 
his recovery. He further argues that High Valley made a profit of $75,000 in 2001, and 
Beck caused Sargent to lose his share of the profit and his capital contribution. 
As stated previously in this decision, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict (JNOV) under Rule 50(b), I.R.C.P., is simply a delayed motion for directed 
verdict that admits the truth of the non moving party's evidence and reasonable 
T 
inferences; and requires the trial court to determine as a matter of law whether there was 
sufficient evidence for reasonable minds to have reached the verdict. 
Initially, the Court concludes that Beck as the owner of the majority of limited 
liability units of High Valley and as the holder of Sargent's units owed Sargent a 
fiduciary duty. There was sufficient evidence, if the jury believed it, to find that Beck was 
holding Sargent's 49% interest in High Valley for a few years so that Beck could take 
100% of tax losses. There was sufficient evidence, if the jury believed it to find that 
Beck excluded Sargent and wrongfully took his 49% when Sargent had contributed as 
much capital as Beck. High Valley's operating agreement in paragraph 10.03 limits a 
limited liability company member's recourse on dissolution to the remaining assets of the 
company, and prohibits recourse against any other member for return of any net profit 
and capital contribution. However, paragraph-1 0.03 does not specifically exclude a cause 
of action from breach of fiduciary duty, and no case authority has been provided by Beck 
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wherein any court has so held. On first impression, this Court holds that paragraph 10.03 
does not, as a matter of law, exclude recovery against Beck for breach of fiduciary duty. 
The jury could have found from the evidence that High Valley made a $75,000 profit in 
2001. The jury could have found that in February, 2002 the company had a net worth, 
and that Beck kept Sargent's 49% of the net worth. The jury could have determined that 
the $49,000 verdict awarded to High Valley increased its net worth. While the Court 
cannot itself determine the net worth of High Valley in February, 2002 from the 
evidence, it also cannot hold as a matter of law that the jury could not have determined it. 
The argument of the parties on this point has not convinced the Court to substitute its 
judgment for the jury's verdict. 
Therefore, Beck's motion for JNOV in case CV-07-118 must be denied. 
F. GLENDALE'S ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS IN CV-02-484 
Following entry of a judgment on the verdict in CV-02-484, Glendale timely filed 
an affidavit for attorney fees and costs signed by counsel John Ohman. Glendale claims 
$47,925.00 attorney fees and $3,271.48 discretionary costs incurred through attorney 
Ohrnan, and claims $1 9,038.50 attorney fees, $742.35 costs of right, and $206.97 
discretionary costs incurred through former attorney William Faler. 
High Valley objects and moved to disallow Glendale's request for attorney fees 
and costs based on several arguments, including: 1) Glendale is not a prevailing party 
because the jury verdict and judgment required Glendale to return some of High Valley's 
property; 2) Faler did not represent Glendale before November, 2006; 3) Faler had a 
conflict of interest preventing representation of Glendale; 4) Faler's charges were not 
necessary when Ohman represented Glendale; 5) no separate affidavit was signed by 
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Faler as required by Rule 54(e)(5) attesting to the basis of computing his fees; 6) 
Ohrnan's invoices do not show the amount of time per task performed; 7) $9,856.50 of 
Ohman's charges are unreasonable; 8) $571.21 of Ohman's deposition costs were not 
paid to a court reporter; 9) Ohrnan's discretionary costs were not necessary or 
exceptional; and 10) some of Glendale attorney fees should be reduced based n equitable 
considerations. 
Rule 54, I.R.C.P., entitles a prevailing party in a civil action to certain costs, and 
where permitted by statute a reasonable attorney fee. In determining the prevailing party, 
the trial court must utilize its discretion and consider the final judgment or result of the 
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC 
v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005). Although, High 
Valley argues that Glendale was not the prevailing party because the jury verdict and 
judgment stated Glendale should return an L10 motor, a transfer case and a CAT 3306 
motor, the Court disagrees. High Valley's amended complaint against Glendale sought 
only damages for conspiracy to commit fraud, conversion and unjust enrichment. In 
closing argument High Valley requested the jury to award several thousand dollars in 
both compensatory and punitive damages. Counsel did not request return of any property. 
The jury's verdict stating property should be returned was merely gratuitous. The Court 
judgment parroting the jury's suggestion was also gratuitous. High Valley did not seek to 
amend its complaint to seek specific performance. None of the relief sought by High 
Valley was awarded. Glendale was the overall prevailing party and is entitled to costs 
and attorney fees provided by statute. 
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Although Idaho Code 12-121 was cited by Glendale as a basis for award of 
attorney fees, Glendale does not seriously argue that the case was pursued frivolously or 
without basis in law or fact, and the Court finds that this statute does not apply to this 
case. The parties all argued in briefs and orally that the transaction between High Valley 
and Glendale was a commercial transaction and that Idaho Code 12-1 20(3) applies to the 
claims in this case. This is essentially a stipulation to apply Idaho Code 12-1 20(3), and 
therefore, the Court so finds that Glendale is entitled to a reasonable attorney fee under 
Idaho Code 12-120(3) and Rule 54(e), I.R.C.P. 
The $19,038.50 of attorney fees presumably incurred by Mr. Faler for Glendale as 
set out in Exhibit B to Mr. Ohrnan's affidavit cannot be awarded to Glendale. First, Rule 
54(e)(5), I.R.C.P., requires that "the claim for attorney fees as costs shall be supported by 
an affidavit of the attorney stating the basis and method of computation of the attorney 
fees claimed." (Bold emphasis added) This affidavit must contain enough information 
for the trial court to apply the factors in Rule 54(e)(3). Mr. Ohman's affidavit is far short 
for this purpose, since he has little idea what Mr. Faler was doing during the time periods 
for which the $19,000 is sought. Mr. Faler did not file an affidavit to support Glendale's 
claim, although he did file an affidavit to support Sargent's claim. The Court has 
examined Faler's affidavit filed for Sargent, and it is not sufficient to cover the $1 9,000 
claimed by Glendale. The Court need not consider High Valley's other arguments, 
however, the Court agrees that Faler cannot charge Glendale for work after December 
28,2006, when Judge Moss disqualified Faler from representing Glendale. 
The Court has examined Mr. Ohrnan's charges for legal services rendered for 
Glendale from Exhibit A to his affidavit along with the specific objections argued in High 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
Page 320 
Valley's brief. The Court agrees that Ohman cannot charge $2,520 for trial on Saturday 
February 2,2008, when the jury verdict came in at 7:00 p.m. on Friday, February 1 ,  
2008. The Court finds that Ohman's other charges are reasonable, including the use of a 
paralegal at trial to help keep track of the numerous exhibits of all parties. Therefore, 
Glendale is awarded a reasonable attorney fee of $45,405.00. 
A11 of Glendale's discretionary costs of $3,271.48 set out in Ohrnan7s affidavit, 
including faxes, long distance telephone, photocopies, postage, travel and lodging were 
ordinary litigation expenses, not exceptional expenses. Using the Court's discretionary 
such discretionary costs are disallowed. The costs claimed in Exhibit B to Ohman's 
affidavit are either non-exceptional discretionary costs, or not incurred for Glendale. The 
costs for copies of depositions defended by Mr. Faler in April and June, 2006 appear to 
be incurred for Sargent. Glendale was not a party to the litigation until an amended 
complaint was filed and served in November, 2006. However, Ohman's affidavit is 
sufficient under Rule 54(d), I.R.C.P., to establish that filing fees of $87.00 were paid to 
the clerk on behalf of Glendale. Therefore, Glendale is awarded $87.00 costs of right. 
G .  HIGH VALLEY'S ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS IN CV-02-484 
Following entry of a judgment on the verdict in CV-02-484, High Valley timely 
filed an affidavit for attorney fees and costs signed by counsel Bryan Smith. High Valley 
claims $ 74,071.62. attorney fees, and $ 12,882.17 costs. 
Sargent objects to High Valley's request for attorney fees and costs based on 
several arguments, including: 1) High Valley was not the prevailing party because the 
jury awarded only $49,000 when High Valley argued for $661,000; and 2) Beck did not 
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prevail in CV-07-118 and High Valley has not segregated out fees and costs incurred for 
Beck's defense of that action. 
Rule 54, I.R.C.P., entitles a prevailing party in a civil action to certain costs, and 
where permitted by statute a reasonable attorney fee. In determining the prevailing party, 
the trial court must utilize its discretion and consider the final judgment or result of the 
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC 
v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 ldaho 716, 1 17 P.3d 130 (2005). In this case all 
parties argue that Idaho Code 12-120(3) applies as the gravamen of the action was a 
commercial transaction. 
Although, the jury verdict was only approximately $49,000, the Court concludes 
that such amount is substantial when compared to High Valley's closing argument 
request of $332,000. Therefore High Valley was the prevailing party as against Sargent. 
High Valley has excluded from its request all attorney fees incurred to pursue claims 
against Glendale. It has not excluded attorney fees incurred for Beck. Because the facts of 
the two lawsuits are intermingled only a small amount of additional legal work was 
needed to respond to Sargent's claims against Beck in CV-07-118, i. e., preparing an 
answer, responding to discovery in that action, a few minutes additional time in Beck's 
and Sargent's depositions; and one additional day of trial time for additional direct, cross 
and redirect examination and dealing with about 50 extra exhibits. Thus, the Court 
reduces High Valley's attorney fees approximately 10% or $7,400. Therefore, High 
Valley is awarded $ 66,671.62 as a reasonable attorney fee. 
The Court concludes that some of High Valley's costs were incurred in CV-07- 
1 18, including $66.00 for filing fees and $400 of the cost of volumes I11 and IV of Cary 
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Sargent's deposition. The Court concludes that some of High Valley's costs in CV-02- 
484 were incurred to pursue Glendale, including service fees for depositions for Glendale 
of $30, Kim Allen, Joan and Gil Sluder of $120, service of amended complaint on 
Glendale of $ 60, writ of execution on Glendale's Bank of $60, trial subpoena on Kim 
Allen of $60, depositions costs for Glendale of $ 109, Gene Sluder of $98, Gib Sluder of 
$ 59.50, Joan Sluder of $105.27, and Kim Allen of $275.30. The Court concludes that 
some of High Valley's costs were not exceptional discretionary costs, including Zip 
Print copies of $20.99, $27.99, $423.49 and $202.72; binders $ 143.18 and $96.70; 
projector rental $96.09; photograph sheets $21.57 and photocopies $2,732.85. These 
costs totaling $ 5,208.65 are disallowed. High Valley is awarded $ 7,773.52 costs of 
right against Sargent. 
H. SARGENT'S ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS IN CV-07-118 
Following entry of a judgment on the verdict in CV-07-118, Sargent timely filed 
an affidavit for attorney fees and costs signed by counsel William Faler. Sargent claims 
$ 5 1,989.50 attorney fees, $ 1,8 18.65 costs of right, and $ 185.78 discretionary costs. 
Beck objects and moved to disallow Sargent's request for attorney fees and costs 
based on several arguments, including: 1) Sargent is not the prevailing party because his 
$28,896.88 verdict is offset by High Valley's $48,98 1.16 verdict, resulting in an 
"overall" net loss of $20,084.28; 2) $1 9,020.77 of Sargent's claimed attorney fees were 
incurred between July 22,2002 and February, 2006, whereas Sargent's complaint was 
not filed until February 22,2006; 3) Sargent's counsel did not "certify" under Rule 
54(d)(5) that the fees are "correct"; 4) Sargent did not provide the hourly rate which 
appears to average $190 per hour; 5) Sargent is claiming $ 5,13 1.95 from November 20 
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through December 14,2006, and $248.01 on March 30,2006, for time spent on behalf of 
Glendale; 6) Sargent's fees were unreasonable as to the amount of time spent doing 
certain tasks or doing work a paralegal might do; 7) Sargent's "unidentified court costs" 
and discretionary costs for photocopies and travel; and 8) Sargent's request for attorney 
fees is "inequitable, unfair and dishonest." 
Rule 54, I.R.C.P., entitles a prevailing party in a civil action to certain costs, and 
where permitted by statute a reasonable attorney fee. Jn determining the prevailing party, 
the trial court must utilize its discretion and consider the final judgment or result of the 
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC 
v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 11 7 P.3d 130 (2005). In this case all 
parties argue that Idaho Code 12-1 20(3) applies as the gravamen of the action was a 
commercial transaction. While Sargent's memorandum of attorney fees and costs also 
refers to Idaho Code 12-121, this Court concludes that the defense by Beck was not 
frivolous and that section does not apply. 
Sargent's action in CV-07-118 was against Beck, not High Valley, and the jury 
returned a verdict of nearly $29,000 based on breach of fiduciary duty. Although in 
closing argument Sargent requested over $79,000, under the reasoning of Eighteen Mile 
Ranch the nearly $29,000 verdict is a substantial recovery in CV-07-118. While Sargent 
lost in CV-02-484 and many of the facts and claims were similar, nevertheless CV-07- 
1 I8 was a separate action against a different party. Thus, Sargent was the prevailing party 
and is entitled to a reasonable attorney fee under Idaho Code 12-1 20(3). In a case of first 
impression, this court rejects Beck's argument that equitable principles should be used to 
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disallow attorney fees to Sargent because ldaho Code 12- 120(3) is a mandatory statutory 
remedy where the courts have no discretion except as to the amount. 
The Court concludes that $1 9,020.77 of Sargent's attorney fees incurred between 
July 22,2002 and February 22,2006 are not recoverable in CV-07-118, but it appears 
that Sargent's counsel is not claiming those fees in CV-02-484. Mr. Faler's affidavit is 
adequate to substantially comply with rule 54(d)(5) and detailed enough for the Court to 
apply the factors in Rule 54(e)(3) to determine a reasonable attorney fee. Comparing the 
billings attached to the Ohrnan affidavit with those attached to the Faler affidavit, the 
Court concludes that no Glendale attorney fees are claimed as part of CV-07-118. 
Having considered the factors in rule 54(e)(3) , the billing's attached to Faler's affidavit, 
Beck's objections, and the Court's knowledge of the court files, facts and legal theories 
presented, the Court concludes that $51,989.50 is a reasonable attorney fee for Sargent 
in CV-07-118. 
Sargent is awarded $ 82.00 for filing fee, $25.00 for service fee, $1,226.75 for 
deposition transcript, for Total costs of right of $1,333.75. Discretionary costs claimed 
for photocopies and travel were not exceptional and are disallowed. 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that 
1. Sargent's motion for JNOV on fraud claim in CV-2-484 is DENIED; 
2. Sargent's motion for new trial in both cases is DENIED; 
3. Sargent's motion for additur in CV-07-118 is DENIED; 
4. High Valley's motion for prejudgment interest in CV-02-484 is DENIED; 
5. Beck's motion for JNOV in CV-07-118 is DENIED; 
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6. Glendale is awarded $ 45,405.00 attorney fees and $ 87.00 costs of right in 
CV-02-484 against High Valley; 
7. High Valley is awarded $ 66,671.62 attorney fees and $ 7,673.52 costs of 
right in CV-02-484 against Sargent; 
8. Sargent is awarded $ 51, 989.50 attorney fees and $ 1,333.75 costs of right in 
CV-07-118 against Beck. 
DATED this@ay of March, 2008. 
' RICHARD T. ST. CLAIR 
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this st day of March, 2008,I did send a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage 
thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by 
causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Bryan D. Smith 
P. 0. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
William D. Faler 
P. 0 .  Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
John M. Ohrnan 
P. 0. Box 5 1600 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
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Bryan D. Smith, Ilsq. - ISB No. 441 1 
B. J. Driscoll, 1Jsq. - ISB No. 70 1 0 
McGRATH, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. 0. Box 5073 1 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-073 1 
Telefax: (208) 529-4 1 66 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, High Valley Concrete, L.L.C., 
And Defendant, Doyle Beck. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THZ SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AN{) FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
Case No. CV-02-0484 
Case No. CV-07-0118 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
corporation, 
Defendants 
CONSOLIDATED WITH 4 
CARY SARGENT, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOYLE BECK and MARK FULLER, 
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TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS, CARY SARGENT 
AND HIS ATTORNEY, WILLIAM D. FALER, ESQ., of the firm HOLDEN, 
KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.; GLENDALE CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
AN IDAHO CORPORATION AND ITS ATTORNEY, JOHN M. OHMAN, ESQ., 
of the firm COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER, CHARTEREDAND TO THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named defendant, Doyle Beck, appeals to the Idaho Supreme 
Court from the District Court's Judgment entered February 7,2008 and Amended 
Judgment entered March 3 1, 2008 in the above-entitled action against defendant, Doyle 
Beck, and in favor of plaintiff, Cary Sargent, Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District 
Judge, presiding. 
2. The above-named plaintiff, High Valley Concrete, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the District Court's 
Judgment entered February 7,2008 and Amended Judgment entered March 3 1,2008 in 
the above-entitled action against defendant, Cary Sargent, and in favor of plaintiff, High 
Valley Concrete, LLC, an Idaho limited iiability company, Honorable Richard T. St. 
Clair, District Judge, presiding. 
3. Beck and High Valley Concrete, LLC have the right to appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and the judgments described in paragraphs one and two above are subject 
to appeal pursuant to Rule 1 I (a), Idaho Appellate Rules. 
4. The issues which Beck intends to assert on appeal are the following: 
a. Is the jury's award of $28,896.88 supported by substantial evidence? 
b. Did the district court commit reversible error when it determined that 
substantial evidence supports the jury's award of $28,896.88? 
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5.  The issue which High Valley Concrete, LLC intends to assert on appeal is 
the following: 
a. Did the district court commit reversible error when it denied High 
Valley's motion for prejudgment interest? 
6. There has been no order entered sealing any portion of the record in this 
case. 
5.  Beck and High Valley Concrete, LLC request that the reporter prepare the 
transcripts of the trial dated January 24,2008 through February 1,2008. Beck and High 
Valley, LLC request that the reporter not prepare the opening statements of counsel. Beck 
and High Valley LLC further request that the reporter not prepare any of the closing 
arguments of Bryan D. Smith or John M. Ohrnan. Beck and High Valley, LLC do request 
that the reporter prepare the closing argument of William D. Faler. 
6.  Beck and High Valley Concrete, LLC request the following documents be 
included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, 
Idaho Appellate Rules: 
a. High Valley Concrete, LLC's Motion for Award of Prejudgment 
Interest dated February 20,2008; 
b. The Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated February 20,2008; 
c. High Valley Concrete, LLC's Brief in Support of Award of 
Prejudgment Interest dated February 20,2008; 
d. Beck's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict dated 
February 20,2008; 
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e. Heck's Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict dated February 20,2008; 
f. Affidavit of Attorney William D. Faler in Support of Motion for 
Additur dated February 2 I ,  2008; 
g- Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Post-Judgment Motions dated 
March 10,2008; and 
h. Memorandum decision and order dated March 26,2008. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter; 
(b) That the reporter who reported the trial before the district court has 
been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcripts; 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid; 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20, Igaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this ?'%ay of May, 2008. 
McGRATH, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, 
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CERTIFICATE OR SJCRVICE 
4% 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7 day of May, 2008 1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by placing the same 
in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by 
hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
[ 6 s .  Mail 
[ -simile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ 1 Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ @ ~ e l i v e r ~  
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
[ -Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ find Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
William D. Faler, Esq. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN 
& CRAPO, PLLC 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
John M. Ohman, Esq. 
COX, OHMAN & 
BRANDSTETTER, CHTD 
P.O. Box 5 1600 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Debbie Mace 
Clerk of the District Court 
Fremont County Courthouse 
15 1 West 1 North, Room 12 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
T&T Reporting 
Certified Court Reporters 
P. 0 .  Box 5 1020 
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William D. Faler, Esq. 
Idaho State Bar No. 1464 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Mailing Address: 
P. 0 .  Box 501 30 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-95 18 
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Attorneys for Appellant Cary Sargent 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FEMONT 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., 
an Idaho Limited Liability Company 
PlaintifE/Respondent, 
VS . 
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
DefendantIAppellant . 
CARY SARGENT, 
PlaintifUAppellant, 
vs . 
DOYLE BECK and MARK FULLER, 
DefendantsRespondent . 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. CV-02-00484 
Case No. CV-07-00 1 18 
TO: High Valley Concrete, L.L.C., Doyle Beck, and their attorneys of record, Bryan D. 
Smith and B.J. Driscoll of the law firm McGrath, Meacham, Smith, P.L.L.C.; 
Glendale Construction, Inc, and its attorney of record, John M. Ohman of the law 
firm Cox, Ohman and Brandstetter; and the Clerk of the Seventh Judicial District - 
Fremont County: 
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1. NOTICE: 
The above named Appellant, Cary Sargent, by and through his attorney of record, 
William D. Faler, of the law firm Holden, Kidwell, Halhn & Crapo, P.E.L.C., appeals fiom the 
District Court's Judgment entered February 7,2008, the Amended Judgment entered March 31, 
2008, and the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order entered March 27,2008, all in Fremont 
County Case No. CV-02-484, the Honorable Richard T. St. Clair presiding, against the above- 
named Respondent High Valley Concrete, LLC, to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
The above named Appellant, Cary Sargent, by and through his attorney of record, 
William D. Faler, of the law firm Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.E.L.C., appeals fiom the 
District Court's Judgment entered February 7,2008, the Amended Judgment entered March 3 1, 
2008, and the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order entered March 27,2008, all in Fremont 
County Case No. CV-07-118, the Honorable Richard T. St. Clair presiding, against the above- 
named Respondent Doyle Beck, to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
2. RIGHT OF APPEAL: 
The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order previously 
described is an appealable decision under and pursuant to Rule 1 1 (a)(5) and Rule 1 1 (a)(6), I.A.R. 
3. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL: 
1. High Valley Concrete, LLC v. Cary Sargent - Fremont County Case No. CV-02- 
484: 
a. Was there sufficient evidence to support a verdict on the fraud count? 
b. Is the jury's award sf $48,98 1.1 6 supported by substantial evidence? 
c. Did the District Court commit reversible error when it determined that 
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substantial evidence supports the jury's award of $48,98 1.16? 
d. Did the District Court commit reversible error when it failed to grant Cary 
Sargent's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict? 
2. Cary Sargent v. Doyle Beck - Fremont County Case No. CV-07-118: 
a. Did the District Court commit reversible error when it failed to grant an 
additur? 
b. Did the District Court error when it awarded Plaintiff Sargent only 
$28,896.88 of the requested $79,571.00. 
4. STATUS OF THE RECORD: 
The Appellant nor his attorney of record have any knowledge of any portion of the record 
being sealed in this matter. 
5. REQUEST FOR REPORTER9S TRANSCNPT 
A reporter's transcript of the trial is requested. 
6. WEQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS PURSUANT TO RULE 28,1.A.R: 
1. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict in Fremont County Case No. 
CV-02-484; 
2. Affidavit of William D. Faler in Support of Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict in Fremont County Case No. CV-02-484. 
3. Motion for Additur in Fremont County Case No. CV-07-118; 
4. Affidavit of William D. Faler in Support of Motion for Additur in Fremont 
County Case No. CV-07-118; and 
5 .  Memorandum Decision and Order filed March 27,2008, in both Fremont County 
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Cases CV-02-484 and CV-07-1118. 
7. CERTIFICATION: 
William D. Faler, certifies that: 
1. A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on Debby Mace, Fremont County 
Court Clerk. 
2. A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on T&T Reporting, Certified 
Court Reporters. 
3. The estimated fee for the additional transcript requested by Appellant has been 
paid. 
4. The estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record of $200.00 has been 
paid to the Fremont County District Court Clerk. 
5.  The filing fee of $1 5.00 has been paid to the Fremont County District Court Clerk. 
6. The filing fee of $86.00 for the Supreme Court has been provided to the Fremont 
County District Court to be forwarded with the certified copy of this Notice of 
Appeal to the Supreme Court. 
7. Service has been made upon all parties as required pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
Dated this C $ a y  of ~ a y ,  2008. 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or 
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the 
f 'day of May, 2008. correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on this 
DOCUMENT SERVED: Notice of Appeal - Cary Sargent 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
John M. Ohman 
Cox Ohman & Brandstetter 
P.O. Box 51600 [ Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600 I [ ]Other 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
G \WPDATA\WDR_Client Files R-S\Sargent lO82AWord ProcessingMppealWoticc of Appeal.@ 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB No. 441 1 
B. J .  Driscoll, Esq. - ISB No. 701 0 
McGRATH, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. 0. Box 5073 1 
4 1 4 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-073 1 
Telefax: (208) 529-4 1 66 
'" ' ~ e p u t y  Clerk 
Attorneys for Appellants, High Valley Concrete, L.L.C., 
And Doyle Beck. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE 
CONSTRUCTION, NC. ,  an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
CONSOLIDATED WITH 
CARY SARGENT, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOYLE BECK and MARK FULLER, 
Case No. CV-02-0484 
Case No. CV-07-0118 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Defendants. 1 
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TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS, CARY SARGENT 
AND HIS ATTORNEY, WILLIAM D. FALER, ESQ., of the firm HOLDEN, 
IUDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.; GLENDALE CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
AN IDAHO CORPORATION AND ITS ATTORNEY, JOHN M. OHMAN, ESQ., 
of the firm COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER, CHARTEREDAND TO THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named defendant, Doyle Beck, appeals to the Idaho Supreme 
Court from the District Court's Judgment entered February 7,2008 and Amended 
Judgment entered March 3 1,2008 in the above-entitled action against defendant, Doyle 
Beck, and in favor of plaintiff, Cary Sargent, Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District 
Judge, presiding. 
2. The above-named plaintiff, High Valley Concrete, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the District Court's 
Judgment entered February 7,2008 and Amended Judgment entered March 3 1,2008 in 
the above-entitled action against defendant, Cary Sargent, and in favor of plaintiff, High 
Valley Concrete, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, Honorable Richard T. St. 
Clair, District Judge, presiding, and from the District Court's Memorandum Decision 
entered July 14,2008 denying High Valley Concrete, LLC's Motion to Contest Claim of 
Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption, Honorable Brent J. Moss, presiding. 
3. Beck and High Valley Concrete, LLC have the right to appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and the judgments and decision described in paragraphs one and two 
above are subject to appeal pursuant to Rule 1 1 (a), Idaho Appellate Rules. 
4. The issues which Beck intends to assert on appeal are the following: 
a. Is the jury's award of $28,896.88 supported by substantial evidence? 
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b. Did the district court commit reversible error when it determined that 
substantial evidence supports the jury's award of $28,896.88? 
5. The issues which High Valley Concrete, LLC intends to assert on appeal are 
the following: 
a. Did the district court commit reversible error when it denied High 
Valley's motion for prejudgment interest? 
b. Did the district court commit reversible error when it denied High 
Valley's motion to contest claim of exemption and third-party claim of exemption? 
6. There has been no order entered sealing any portion of the record in this 
case. 
5.  Beck and High Valley Concrete, LLC request that the reporter prepare the 
transcripts of the trial dated January 24,2008 through February 1,2008. Beck and High 
Valley, LLC request that the reporter not prepare the opening statements of counsel. Beck 
and High Valley LLC further request that the reporter not prepare any of the closing 
arguments of Bryan D. Smith or John M. Ohman. Beck and High Valley, LLC do request 
that the reporter prepare the closing argument of William D. Faler. 
6. Beck and High Valley Concrete, LLC request the following documents be 
included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, 
Idaho Appellate Rules: 
a. High Valley Concrete, LLC's Motion for Award of Prejudgment 
Interest dated February 20'20G8; 
b. The Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated February 20,2008; 
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c. High Valley Concrete, LLC's Brief in Support of Award of 
Prejudgment Interest dated February 20,2008; 
d. Beck's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict dated 
February 20,2008; 
e. Beck's Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict dated February 20,2008; 
f. Affidavit of Attorney William D. Faler in Support of Motion for 
Additur dated February 2 1,2008; 
g. Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Post-Judgment Motions dated 
March 10,2008; 
h. Memorandum decision and order dated March 26,2008; 
1. Third Party Claim of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
dated April 10,2008, together with the Security Agreement attached thereto and 
marked as Exhibit A; 
j- Claim of Exemption from Cary Sargent dated April 10,2008; 
k. High Valley Concrete, LLC's Motion to Contest Claim of 
Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption dated April 18,2008, together with 
Exhibits "A" and "B" attached thereto; 
1. High Valley Concrete, LLC's Brief in Support of Motion to Contest 
Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption dated April 18,2008; 
m. Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated April 18,2008, together with 
Exhibits "A" and " B  attached thereto; 
n. Affidavit of William D. Faler dated April 29,2008; 
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o. Affidavit of Cary Sargent dated April 29,2008; 
p. Notice dated April 30,2008, signed by the Honorable Brent J. Moss; 
q. Supplemental Affidavit of William D. Faler dated May 14, 2008; 
r. Sargent7s Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement dated May 
14,2008; 
s. High Valley Concrete, LLC's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to 
Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption dated May 20, 
2008; and 
t. Memorandum Decision dated July 10,2008, signed by the 
Honorable Brent J. Moss. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of amended appeal has not been served on 
the reporter because defendant does not request any further record be transcribed; 
(b) That the appellate filing fee has already been paid; and 
(c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 
DATED this 6 day of July, 2008. 
McGRATH, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
By: 
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CERTIFICATE OF Sl$RVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the z e 0 f  July, 2008 1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by 
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight delivery, addressed to 
the following: 
[ 4433. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
[m. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ 1 Courthouse Mail Box 
[+WS. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
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William D. Faler, Esq. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN 
& CRAPO, PLLC 
P.O. Box 50 130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
John M. Ohrnan, Esq. 
COX, OHMAN & 
BRANDSTETTER, CHTD 
P.O. Box 5 1600 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Debbie Mace 
Clerk of the District Court 
Fremont County Courthouse 
15 1 West 1 " North, Room 12 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Cary Sargent ) Supreme Court No. 35312135313 
Plaintiff(s)lAppellant(s), ) 
) Case No. CV2002-484 
VS ) CV2007-118 
Doyle Beck 
) 
) CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Defendant(s)lRespondent(s). ) 
Mark Fuller 
1 
) 
Defendant ) 
) 
High Valley Concrete, LLC an ldaho ) 
Limited liability company 1 
Plaintiff(s)lAppellant(s), ) 
v. 
1 
) 
Cary Sargent and Glendale 
Construction, Inc., an Idaho Corp ) 
Defendant(s)lRespondent(s). ) 
I, Becky Harrigfeid, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for Fremont County, do hereby certify that the following is a list of the 
exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as 
indicated: 
DESCRIPTION 
Missing Cash and Trades 
Parts and Service on Personal Vehicles lnvoices 
lnvoices 
Photography lnvoices 
High Valley Concrete Vendor QuickReport 
Dated 4/2/2002 
Grocery lnvoices 
Miscellaneous lnvoices 
Vehicle Payment Checks 
Check to Lynn Gneiting 
SENTIRETAINED 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
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Dated 1 112712001 
1997 - 2002 Fuel Expenditures 
Summary of High Valley Wages Overpayment to Cary Sargent 
Cary Sargent Partner One - Copies of cancelled checks 
Cancelled checks Cary Sargent Wrote to himself from High Valley 
Lease Agreement 
Date 311011 998 
Lease Agreement 
Dated 311 011 998 
Cancelled check - Glendale Construction, Inc. 
Dated 21612002 
Vendor Payout Spreadsheet 
Dated 5171200 1 - 212012002 
Vendor Payout Spreadsheet 
Time Cards 
Cancelled check - Glendale Construction, Inc. 
Dated 211 812002 
Cancelled check - Glendale Construction, Inc. 
Dated 211 112002 
Cancelled check - Glendale Construction, Inc. 
Dated 91911 998 
Glendale Construction Invoice 
Dated 611 911 998 
Articles of Organization - High Valley Concrete 
Dated 212212002 
Articles of Incorporation - High Valley Concrete 
Dated 31611 998 
Glendale Construction, Inc. Letter to Carey Sargent 
Dated 412012004 
Fuller & Carr Letter to Carey Sargent 
Dated 111 911 999 
Timecards for work on Carey Sargent's Vehicles 
Trustee's Assignment 
Dated 911 12005 
Shipping Lists from Western States CAT 
Rigby, Thatcher, Andrus, Rigby, Kam, & Moeller Letter 
Dated 312711 998 
Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers lnvoice 
Dated 61512001 
Glendale Construction Statement 
Dated 612911999 
Glendale Construction Invoice 
Dated 1/6/1999 
High Valley Payments that Funded Kickin Koncrete 
Cancelled check - Glendale Redi-Mix 
Dated 11711 999 
Articles of Organization for High Valley Concrete 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
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Dated 3/24/97 
Ownership Certificate(Sargent) 
Dated 413107 
Schedule A to Operating Agreement 
Dated 4/2/97 
Ownership Certificate (Beck) 
Dated 413197 
Schedule A to Operating Agreement 
Minutes of Special Meeting of the Managers of High Valley 
Dated 4/3/97 10:OO am 
Minutes of Special Meeting of the Managers of High Valley 
Dated 4/3/97 10:30 am 
Stock Certificate - 100 Units to Doyle Beck 
Dated 4/3/97 
Minutes of Annual Meeting of the Members of High Valley 
Dated 2122102 
Operating Agreement 
Dated 412197 
Letter from Wells Fargo 
Dated 1 012101 
Check (Voided) to Beco for $50,000.00 
Dated 11127101 
Copy of Accounting - Beco Construction 
Dated 1 1127101 
Copy of Promissory Note for $1 25,000.00 
Dated 8/27/00 
First Security Bank Modification Agreement 
Dated 5124199 
First Security Bank Modification Agreement 
Dated 3126199 
First Security Bank Modification Agreement 
Dated 1/25/99 
First Security Bank Modification Agreement 
Dated 1 1128198 
Copy of checks 1067, 1068 & 1069 
Dated 2/5/99 
Wells Fargo memo to Doyle Beck 
Dated 1211 8101 
Copy of checks 5147 & 5148 
Dated 1 013101 
High Valley Concrete Profit and Loss - 111197 - I2130197 
Dated I2130197 
Screener Lists 1999 to 2001 [Employee Hours] 
First Security Leasing Agreement - Doyle Beck 
Date 1129100 
First Security Promissory Note - Doyle Beck 
Dated 8/27/00 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
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First Security Master Equipment Loan & Security Agreement 
Dated 717199 
First Security Promissory Note and Guarantee 
Dated 6129199 
Purchase Order 
Dated 413197 
High Valley Concrete Profit and Loss - 9199 through 10199 
Dated 1 1199 
Copy of check 1264 - First Consumers National Bank 
Dated 211 8102 
Copy of checks 5039,5040, & 5046 
Dated 12118101 & 12120101 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss -January 2000 
Dated 111 1102 
Copy of checks 1043,1041,1045,1047 
Dated 1211 9197 & 6/27/99 
Copy of Check 5066 
Dated 118102 
Release of claim - unsigned and not dated 
Handy Truck Line Quote 
Dated 5/28/99 
First Security Bank - Due Notice 
Dated 1 014100 
Reconciliation Report 
Dated 211 2/02 
KeyBank Banking Statement 
Dated 4130197 
Copy of checks 41 76 & 279 
Dated 1 1120100 
Copy of check 4926 
Dated 1 1127101 
State Insurance Fund - RenewallAudit Payroll Report 
Dated 3125199 
Time Cards 
Dated 8131101 - 111 8102 
Load Reports 
Dated 8131101 - 1 1126101 
Hours of Repair on Screener by Employees 
First Security Bank Modification Agreement 
Dated 1125199 
First Security Bank Modification Agreement 
Dated 1 I25199 
First Security Bank Modification Agreement 
Dated 5124199 
First Security Bank Modification Agreement 
Dated 5/24/99 
Copy of checks to High Valley Concrete 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
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Dated 511 197 & 4125197 
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs 
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs by Heath Wood 
Time Card - Heath Wood 
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs - Britt Briggs 
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs - Damon Challis 
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs - Stacey Shaw 
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs - Don Park 
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs - Travis Froehlich 
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs - Scott Allen 
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs - Edgar Barney 
Time Card - Paul Gallup 
Time Card - Gregg Whitmore 
High Valley lnvoice - BECO 
High Valley lnvoice - Roker Materials 
High Valley lnvoice - BECO 
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs 
April Spreadsheet - Sales 
May 2001 - December 2001 Sales 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
Dated 111 1102 
Check Register Spreadsheet 
Dated 51911 997 - 211 812002 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
Dated 2/1/02 
Copies of Cary Sargent Checks & Invoices 
Odometer Disclosure Statement 
Dated 7123101 
Odometer Disclosure Statement 
Dated 7123101 
W-2 Wage and Tax Statement - 1999 Cary W. Sargent 
W-2 Wage and Tax Statement - 2000 Cary W. Sargent 
W-2 Wage and Tax Statement - 2001 Cary W. Sargent 
Flyer from Robert Taylor & Sons 
Dated 1211 212000 
lnvoice from Erickson Pontiac 
Dated 121611995 
Notice of Application Dismissal 
Dated 611 512001 
Cancelled Checks - Farm Bureau Insurance 
Dated 1998 - 2000 
Cancelled Check - BECO 
Dated 71711 999 
Letter from Laura E. Lowery 
Dated 311 312003 
Cancelled Checks - Cary Sargent to High Valley 
Dated 412511 997 & 511 11 997 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
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Holnam paper with notes 
Letter from Harper-Leavitt Engineering, Inc. 
Dated 612211 998 
Cancelled check - Valley Auto 
Dated 311 611 998 
High Valley Concrete Account QuickReport 
Dated 12131 11 998 
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet 
Dated 1213111 998 
Cancelled checks 
Dated 512211 999, 61911 999, 81511 999, 1 012712000 
Employer Quarterly Unemployment Insurance Tax Report 
Dated 412811 999 
Cancelled check - Glendale Construction 
Dated 511 911 999 
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet 
Dated 1213011999 
W-2 Wage and Tax Statement - 2000 Cary W. Sargent 
W-2 Wage and Tax Statement - 2000 Kim Sargent 
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet 
Dated 12131 12000 
W-2 Wage and Tax Statement - 2001 Kirk D. Sargent 
High Valley Concrete Transaction Detail by Account 
Dated March & June 2001 
High Valley Concrete AIP Aging Summary 
Dated 111 012002 
Handwritten monthly calculations 
Dated 111 999 - 611 999 
Load Reports 
Dated 91112001 - 112512002 
Load Reports 
Dated 91112001 - 112512002 
Handwritten Notes 
Stolen Property Partial List 
Cancelled check - Capital One Services 
Dated 1 01611 999 
Cancelled check - Cary Sargent 
Dated 912911 999 
High Valley Concrete AIR Aging QuickZoom 
Dated 2121 12002 
Fax from BECO 
Dated 112512002 
Invoices from Rays Chevron 
Dated 512612001 
Handwritten Note 
Ownership Certificate for High Valley 
Dated 41311 997 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
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Handwritten check register 
Dated 10127 
Cancelled check - Les Schwab 
Dated 1 112811 997 
Lo Go 5 Transit Mix Batch Plant Specifications 
High Valley Concrete Time Cards 
Dated 811 612000 
Schedule A to the Operating Agreement 
Load Reports 
Dated 8/31 12001 - 1 1126/2001 
High Valley Plant Diagram 
Invoices 
Cancelled check - BECO 
Dated 1 1127/2001 
Receipts 
lnvoice from Lakeview Concrete 
Dated 2/25/2000 
lnvoice from Lakeview Concrete 
Dated 1 131 12000 
OshKosh Truck Order 
Dated 3/27/2001 
Load Reports 
Dated 911 12001 - 211 812002 
ClTlEquipment Finance 
Dated 7/28/2001 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
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Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
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Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
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Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Picture 
Lease Agreement 
Dated 311011998 
Lease Agreement 
Dated 311 011 998 
Lease Agreement 
Dated 311 011 998 
Lease Agreement 
Dated 311 011 998 
Cancelled checks - Glendale Construction 
Dated 2/6/2002 
Commercial Tire Invoice 
Dated 1/14/2002 
Bill History - Glendale Ready Mix 
Dated 1 1911 999 
Copies of check 5098 & 221 1 
Dated 1 213011 998 & 1 I711 999 
Copy of payment - Glendale Ready Mix 
Dated 1 211 11999 
Employee Spreadsheet 
High Valley Concrete Time by Job Detail 
Dated 5/4/2006 
Time Cards 
Dated I1811999 
Time Cards 
Dated 1211 12000 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
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Time Cards 
Dated 1011 912001 
Mileage - Nevada 
Dated 1999 
Correspondence from Glendale Construction 
Copy of check # I  256, Correspondence & lnvoices 
Dated 211 112002 
Invoice & Checks - Glendale Construction 
Dated 1 Ol711999 
lnvoices & Checks - Transport, Inc. 
Dated 411 0101 
Lease Agreement 
Dated 311 011 998 
Deposit Summary 
Dated 612112006 
High Valley Concrete Vendor Spreadsheet & lnvoices 
Letter from Glendale Construction to High Valley Concrete 
Handwritten Calculations & Checks 
Truck Rental to Glendale Construction Spreadsheet 
Copy of Complaint - Valley Ready Mix vs. Cary Sargent, eta1 
Computer Printout 
Dated 2131200 1 
Missing Vehicles Spreadsheet, lnvoice & Checks 
Pictures 
Gregg Whitmore Hours 
Dated 8/31/2001 
Handwritten Statement from Paul Gallup 
Dated 211 812002 
Jackpot Job 
High Valley Concrete Damage Summary 
Insurance Payments 
Missing Tools and Equipment 
1999 Jackpot, Nevada Cost Sheet 
Atomic City1 UGAKI-CCP 
Invoices 
Cary Sargent Schedule K-I 
Dated 1998 
Wells Fargo Bank Photocopy Request Notice 
Dated 3/1/2002 
KeyBank BusinessINon-Personal Signature Card 
Dated 3/27/2002 
KeyBank BusinesslNon-Personal Signature Card 
Dated 411 711 997 
Check Stubs 
Dated 1 1/26/2001 
Return Envelope 
Dated 3/20/2002 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
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Hill & Sons Excavating Statements 
Dated 811 511 999 
Glendale Construction, Inc. lnvoice & Check 
Dated 2/18/2002 
Letter from BECO to High Carey Sargent 
Dated 2/28/2000 
High Valley Concrete AIR Aging Summary 
Dated 7/31/2001 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
Dated 1012000 
Handwritten BECO Construction Order 
Handwritten Note 
lnvoices 
Dated 10131 12000 
High Valley Concrete - 1997 Summary 
KeyBank Statement 
Dated 1/311998 
High Valley Concrete AIR Aging Summary 
Dated 913012001 
High Valley Concrete Payment Record 
Dated 711 911 998 
Handy Wholesale Products lnvoice 
Dated 6/7/2001 
Wolf-Anchor-Rapp, Inc Letter to Jackie Gallup 
Dated 812212001 
Receipts 
Screener Parts 
Dated 612311 999 
Letter from Fuller & Carr to High Valley Concrete 
Dated 611 312001 
High Valley Concrete Deposit Detail 
Dated 112000 
High Valley Concrete AIP Aging Summary 
Dated 812012001 
High Valley Concrete AIP Aging Summary 
Dated 7/31/2001 
Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return 
Dated 611 997 
High Valley Concrete AIR Aging Summary 
Dated 1211 511 998 
High Valley Concrete Open lnvoices by Customer 
Dated 1 113011998 
Credit Application 
Dated 311 997 
Compiled Financial Statements (B) 
Dated 1013111998 
Compiled Financial Statements (A) 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
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Dated 1013111998 
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet 
Dated 212811 998 
Compiled Financial Statements 
Dated 12/31/1997 
Compiled Financial Statements 
Dated 1213111 997 (Replaces April Issues) 
Form 941-V Payment Vouchers 
Dated 2002 
Copies of Cancelled Checks 
Dated 711 111 997 
Pay Stub for Carey Sargent 
Dated 312611 999 
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet 
Dated 12/31/1997 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
May - September 2000 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
January - December 1997 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
January - August 1999 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
July 1999 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
January - April 2000 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
January - August 1999 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
January - August 1999 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
January - December 1999 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
January 2002 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
January 1 - May 10,1999 
Cancelled Checks 
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet 
Dated 1213011997 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
January - September 2000 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
January - April 2000 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
January - December 2000 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
March 2000 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
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May - September 2000 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
May - September 2000 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
January - December 2001 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
January - December 1998 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
January - December 1998 
License Registration 
Dated 11212001 
Adjudication and Water Right Matters Disclosure Addendum 
Dated 31411 998 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
January - July 2001 
List of Equipment 
Copies of Checks 
Dated 1211 812001 
w-2 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
May - September 2000 
Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return 
Dated 12131 11 997 
1999 W-2 
Aggregate Data Sheet 
Dated 9/21/2001 
First Security Bank Analysis Charge 
Employer Quarterly Unemployment Insurance Tax Report 
Dated 413011 999 
Invoice 
Dated 1 21611 999 
U.S. Partnership Return of Income 
Dated 311 011 998 
Letter from Fuller & Carr to Cary Sargent 
Dated 111911999 
Concrete Sales Spreadsheets 
Dated 612511 998 
Letter from Fuller & Carr to High Valley Concrete 
Dated 311 512000 
Letter from Fuller & Carr to High Valley Concrete 
Dated 311 512000 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
December 2000 
High Valley Concrete Transaction Detail by Account 
November 2001 
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
November 2001 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
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High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss 
September 2001 
Handwritten Notes on Meeting with Doyle 
Dated 212 112002 
Handwritten Notes 
Ownership Certificate for High Valley Concrete 
Dated 41311 997 
Minutes of Special Meeting of the Managers 
April 3, 1997 
Ownership Certificate for High Valley Concrete 
Dated 41311 997 
Signature Page 
Dated 9/19/2001 
Minutes of Special Meeting of the Managers 
Dated 41311 997 
Schedule A to the Operating Agreement 
Minutes of Special Meeting of the Managers 
Dated 41311 997 
Annual Summary and Transmittal of U.S. Information Returns 
Dated 2/24/2000 
Ash Grove Cement Company Bill of Lading 
Dated 4/1612001 
Fax Cover Sheet - Cary Sargent to Bonneville 
Dated 1211 012000 
Billy Park Hours 
Dated 101 612001 
Gregg Whitmore Hours 
Dated 9/1/01 
First Security Debit & Copy of Check 
Dated 1 I12012000 
1999 W-3 Transmittal of Wage & Tax Statements 
Arnold Machinery Proposal 
Dated 4/9/2002 
Handwritten Note 
High Valley Checks to Cary Sargent 
Dated 811 512000 
2001 W-2's 
2002 W-2's 
2002 Form 941 -V Payment Voucher 
2000 Loan List 
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet 
Dated 1 113011 998 
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet 
Dated 1 1130/1998 
Concrete Sales Spreadsheet 
Dated 6/1/1998 
High Valley Concrete YTD General Ledger 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
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1/1/1998 - 12/31/1998 
High Valley Concrete AccountQuickReport 
Dated 81811 998 
Cancelled Checks 
Dated 612011 997 
Cancelled Checks 
Dated 6/14/1997 
Cancelled Checks 
Dated 1 1/24/1997 
Robert Fisher Ins Agency Billing Statement & Check 
Dated 411 711 997 
Letter from Fuller & Carr to Cary Sargent 
Dated 211 211 998 
Handwritten Note 
High Valley Concrete AccountQuickReport 
Dated 1211 811 998 
Handwritten note to Cary Sargent 
Invoice to Cary Sargent 
Dated 12/6/1999 
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet 
Dated 1213111 998 
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet 
Dated 1 2/31/1998 
Limited Liability Company Acknowledgment (unsigned) 
Telecopy from Fuller & Carr to Cary Sargent 
Dated 911 411 998 
1997 U.S. Partnership Return of Income 
Dated 3/10/1998 
Deposit Summary (SEALED: CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT TO 
PROTECTIVE ORDER) Dated 121612007 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
Sent 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this 
23'd day of September, 2008. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Cary Sargent ) Supreme Court No. 3531 213531 3 
Plaintiff(s)lAppellant(s), ) 
) Case No. CV2002-484 
VS ) CV2007- 1 1 8 
) 
Doyle Beck ) 
Defendant(s)lRespondent(s). ) AMENDED 
) CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Mark Fuller ) 
Defendant ) 
) 
High Valley Concrete, LLC an ldaho ) 
Limited liability company ) 
Plaintiff(s)lAppellant(s), ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
Cary Sargent and Glendale 1 
Construction, Inc., an Idaho Corp ) 
Defendan t(s)lRespondent(s). ) 
I, Becky Harrigfeld, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for Fremont County, do hereby certify that the following is a list of the 
exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as 
indicated: 
NO DESCRIPTION SENTIRETAINED 
398 No Exhibit 398 - Included one too many ProfitlLoss Labels 
464 Picture Sent 
465 Computer Printout Sent 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this 
1 7rd day of October, 2008. 
Amesded Certificate of Exhibiis 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Cary Sargent ) Supreme Court No. 35312 
Plaintiff(s)/Appellant(s), ) 35313 
VS 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV2002-484 
Doyle Beck ) CV2007-118 
Defendant(s)/Respondent(s). ) 
) Certificate of Service 
Mark Fuller ) 
Defendant ) 
1 
) 
High Valley Concrete, LLC an ldaho ) 
Limited liability company ) 
Plaintiff(s)lAppellant(s), ) 
v. 
) 
) 
Cary Sargent and Glendale 
1 
Construction, Inc., an ldaho Corp 
) 
1 
Defendant(s)/Respondent(s). ) 
I, Abbie Mace, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for Fremont County, do hereby certify that I have personally 
served or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record 
and any reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows: 
Attorney 
For Appellant - Cary Sargent 
William D. Faler 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
PO Box 501 30 
ldaho Falls, ID 83405-01 30 
Attorney 
For Appellant - High Valley 
Bryan D. Smith 
McGrath, Meacham & Smith 
414 Shoup Avenue 
PO Box 50731 
ldaho Falls, ID 83405 
Certificate of Service 
Page 359 
said 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
Court this 23rd day of September, 2008. 
. . I  
, . c . : ' , . ; , ,  
1 !,'! Abbie Mace . .\ \. ,,, . . ' , . , . . , .  ,  ('/.:,, ,.
.?'~ ,;.:< ' .., . ' .? '<, Clerk of the District Court + .  . . .. ... '..,.$. .+, 
Deputy clerk' ' w w  7 , , 
', 
':.c,:.c, r.'. ' \" 
* - .!;,l%[T C\iW \.'- 
- ,>'>, " I "  
'**\/. ~~,i~/~~i,iii' . , , , . , , ,(&\ 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Cary Sargent ) Supreme Court No. 35312 
Plaintiff(s)/Appellant(s), ) 35313 
VS 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV2002-484 
Doyle Beck ) CV2007-118 
Defendant(s)lRespondent(s). ) 
) Clerk's Certificate 
Mark Fuller ) 
Defendant ) 
1 
1 
High Valley Concrete, LLC an ldaho ) 
Limited liability company ) 
Plaintiff(s)lAppellant(s), ) 
v. 
) 
) 
Cary Sargent and Glendale 
1 
Construction, Inc., an ldaho Corp 
) 
) 
Defendant(s)/Respondent(s). ) 
I, Abbie Mace, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Fremont, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a 
true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the ldaho 
Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or admitted 
in the above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along 
with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record. 
Clerk's Certificate 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
Court at St. Anthony, Fremont, Idaho, this 23" day of September, 2008. 
.. , . ., Abbie Mace 3 ,,-: ':& .:.. L t  . . , i i  
, , * - District Court ~ l e r $  :. - . JV~I ; . ,~  : 
. ,  . 
Clerk's Certificate 
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